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INTRODUCTION

Eliminating bad patents is supposed to be a good thing, and so federal law allows
any interested party to challenge a patent's validity at almost any time. But the law
goes a step further than merely conferring broad challenge rights. It also makes them
nearly impossible to contract away. Instead, federal law voids any agreement' not to
challenge a patent. While a contract ordinarily signifies a final resolution of all issues
covered by its terms, no such peace exists in patent licensing.

* Associate Professor of Law and Faculty Director-Entrepreneurship, Innovation and
Law Program, West Virginia University College of Law. The author thanks Colleen Chien, John
Duffy, John Golden, Eric Goldman, Gerald Hobbs, Mark Lemley, Caprice Roberts, David
Schwartz, and Valorie Vojdik, participants in the University of Utah Quinney College of Law,
DePaul University College of Law, and Villanova University School of Law Faculty Colloquia,
and attendees at the 2009 IP Scholars Conference for their helpful comments. Valuable research
assistance was provided by Nate Griffith and Thomas Huycke.
1. This rule has one exception: postlitigation settlement agreements will usually be
enforced. See infra note 15.
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This inalienability of patent challenge rights comes at a cost, which is borne by
many patent licensees and their downstream customers. Patent holders quite rationally
increase the royalties licensees must pay to offset their costs if the patent is challenged,
including litigation costs and loss of royalties if the patent is invalidated. Licensees, it
follows, might seek a lower price by agreeing not to challenge the licensed patent, but
the law will not allow them to do so.
The result is royalty inflation; the policy favoring elimination of bad patents costs
every licensee by providing an inalienable challenge right that might never be
exercised. 2 This cost is a tax of sorts, 3 what this Article calls the "patent-challenge tax."
In addition to inflated royalties, the tax causes trickle-down costs to consumers and
disincentives to create and license patented technology.
These social costs offset the social benefits created by encouraging patent
challenges. Few have recognized these costs and no one has examined them with an
economic model. This Article develops a model that dissects the components of the
patent-challenge tax, examines each component's consequences, and informs the
effectiveness of various strategies that might be used to reduce the tax.
This Article thus offers three advantages over prior efforts. First, the model allows
for a rigorous analysis of whether and how each tax-reduction strategy will work.
Second, rigorous analysis reveals interactions between the model's different
components. For example, conventional wisdom implies that licenses for weak patents
will have the highest tax,4 but this effect is offset by the lower royalties at stake for
such licenses. Third, these interactions lead to some surprising results, such as
patentees with strong patents being more likely to charge a higher premium ifthey have
multiple licensees.
Therefore, the model illuminates important policy considerations that have been
ignored by advocates of eliminating bad patents. One such consideration is that
licensees of strong patents are the least likely to challenge and thus should pay the
lowest tax, while the model shows that they may actually pay the highest tax.
Proponents of the challenge right should consider this anomaly and other perverse
effects. For example, licensees might benefit greatly by being allowed to agree not to
challenge a patent that has already been found valid by a court.
Part I of this Article explains the policy at the core of the patent-challenge tax
model: no patent license is ever final, allowing any licensee to sue to void the license at
any time. First, any contract that purports to license an invalid or noninfiringed patent is

2. See Richard Craswell, PassingOn the Costs of LegalRules: Efficiency andDistribution
in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REv. 361, 362-63 (1991) (potential liability from
buyers to sellers results in costs that are passed on to buyers in the form of higher prices); Alan
Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of ContractLaw, 113 YALE L.J.

541, 567 (2003) (judicial redistribution of agreed benefits causes social costs).
3. Cf Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L.
REv. 305,349 (1992) ("This 'rule,' if we may call it that, reduces overall rent dissipation. It also
imposes a kind of tax on research and development. Inventors of elegant solutions, unlike many
of their competitors, must forfeit the monopoly rent they might otherwise earn.").
4. See Legal Doctrinesthat Affect the Value and LicensingofPatents:Hearingon "The
Evolving I.P. Marketplace"Before the Fed. TradeComm 'n, 5 (2008) (statement ofJoseph Scott
Miller, Professor, Lewis & Clark Law School) [hereinafter Miller].
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void, cutting off the obligation to pay royalties. 5 Second, any contract provision
purporting to bar a challenge to a patent's validity is void.6 Third, any patent licensee
may seek declaratory relief to avoid a license while still paying royalties under that
every licensee can either sue to void a contract or renegotiate by
license. 7 As a result,
8
threatening suit.
Part II introduces and explores the patent-challenge tax and its role in royalty
inflation, and Appendix I fully derives the model. The tax is caused by the patentee's
postlicense risk of both litigation costs and ultimate loss of the royalty stream in case
the licensee decides to challenge the license. Patentees are unconcerned with the social
benefits of patent challenges-eliminating bad patents-because they cannot capture
any value associated with those benefits; indeed, patentee profit goes down as more
patent challenges are mounted. Furthermore, this risk is asymmetric: the challenging
not risk a damages award while it simultaneously sues and pays
licensee does
9
royalties.
While patentees may still be willing to license their patents in the face of this risk, I0
as with any tax some of the perceived costs will be passed on to licensees through
higher royalties or modified royalty structures, which in turn can increase the price
consumers pay for patented goods. As a result, licensees, consumers, and even owners

5. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135 (1969); Brulotte v.
Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 29 (1964); John W. Schlicher, Patent Licensing, What To Do After
MedImmune v. Genentech, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'V 364, 373-74 (2007).
6. 1 JAY DRATLER, JR., LICENSING INTELLECiUALPROPERTY, § 2.02[l][a][i] (2008) ("Thus,
Lear [v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969)] gives a patent licensee a supervening right under federal
law to stop payment and contest the validity of the licensed patent at any time, whether or not
the license contains a no-contest clause."); Schlicher, supra note 5, at 387-88 (citing several
cases that hold no-challenge clauses to be unenforceable).
7. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128-29 (2007).
8. This Article primarily discusses challenges to patent validity, but the discussion applies
to noninflingement challenges as well. Thus, "challenging the patent" should include any
challenge to the requirement of paying royalties under the patent.
9. This risk is even more lopsided, as an invalidity finding will result in loss of every other
license agreement as well, whereas the patentee must prove infringement against each opponent
(and even against each accused product). Others have recognized the risk. See, e.g., Ronald A.
Bleeker & Michael V. O'Shaughnessy, One Year After MedlImmune-The Impact On Patent
Licensing & Negotiation, 17 FED. CiR. B.J. 401 (2008); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss &Lawrence
S. Pope, DethroningLear? Incentives To Innovate After MedImmune, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
971 (2009); Toshihiro Kuwahara & Warren G. Lavey, Drafting Strategiesfor Licensing
Agreements After MedImmune Decision, in JOSEPH YANG & IRA J. LEVY, ADVANCED LICENSING
AGREEMENTS 2008, at 141 (PLI Intellectual Prop., Course Handbook Series No. G-927, 2008);
Sean M. O'Connor, Using Stock andStock Options To Minimize PatentRoyalty PaymentRisks
After MedImmune v. Genentech, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 381 (2007); Schlicher, supra note 5, at
374 (positing that the patentee will charge more for licenses to offset the risk, but the analysis
does not consider many of the nuances associated with probabilistic outcomes and equilibrium
pricing).
10. Because potential licensees are also potential infringement defendants, and thus have
standing to challenge a patent's validity at any time, patentees may prefer a royalty stream today
and litigation risk tomorrow to just litigation risk today and tomorrow. See Peter Jay, Note,
Removing Incentivesfor Technology Transfer: MedImmune v. Genentech, 5 BUFFALO INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 69, 80 (2007).
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of strong, valid patents shoulder much of the costs which are generating the social
benefits associated with challenging invalid patents.
Royalty inflation gives patentees and licensees who do desire peace an incentive
to agree not to challenge the patent' 2-an agreement that is foreclosed by law. Because
licensees cannot credibly agree to abstain from challenges, they must find some other
way to reduce the tax by signaling they will not sue to void the license.
Such signaling has two primary benefits. For the licensee, signals can reduce the
price of the patent license by minimizing the risk of future litigation perceived by the
patentee. 13 It follows that signals also help the patentee determine which potential
licensees might intend to challenge.
Part III analyzes a variety of licensing signal strategies and considers each strategy's
effectiveness, legality, and practicality. 14 Of course, simply lifting the ban on promises
not to challenge would eliminate the need for more complex strategies, but until that
time parties must labor under current law. Thus, an effective option must be binding
but collateral to the no-challenge promise that the parties really want.
Potential strategies are grouped into five categories. Litigation strategies seek to
take advantage of litigation res judicata finality. Up-front payment strategies might
limit challenges because a prepaid licensee has little to gain where no royalties are
outstanding. No-challenge strategies most directly attempt to ban patent challenges by
either barring such challenges outright or by terminating a license if the licensee
challenges. Royalty escalation, cost, and damages strategies create disincentives to
challenge by making challenges more expensive for the licensee. Dispute-resolution
strategies attempt to reduce the tax by reducing litigation costs, as well as limiting the
risk that the patentee will lose royalties associated with its other, nonlitigating
licensees.
This Article concludes that many of these strategies will either be ineffective or
impractical, revealing a quandary. The most effective ways to reduce the patentchallenge tax are also the most likely to be unenforceable. Further, clauses that are
surely legal, like venue selection, are the least likely to be effective.
However, fee- and cost- shifting mechanisms, such as attorneys' fee shifting and
royalty escalation upon an unsuccessful challenge, may be the most effective and
practical of the enforceable strategies to reduce the patent-challenge tax.
Patentees might still prefer royalty escalation and fee shifting to a terminate-onchallenge clause, legality and deterrent effectiveness being equal, 15 for three reasons.

11. Kuwahara & Lavey, supra note 9, at 149-52 (discussing importance of licensing in
wireless telecommunications).
12. John W. Schlicher, A Lear v. Adkins Allegory, 68 J. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y
427, 438-40 (1986) (noting that some licensees support legality of termination on challenge
because litigation risk increased licensing rates); Christian Chadd Taylor, Note, No-Challenge
Termination Clauses: Incorporating Innovation Policy and Risk Allocation into Patent
LicensingLaw, 69 IND. L.J. 215, 215-16 (1993).
13. This risk cannot be completely eliminated, as others may challenge the patent. Thus,

license pricing will always have some litigation risk component.
14. Appendix II provides sample clauses that implement the discussed strategies. This
appendix was first presented to the San Francisco Bay Area Intellectual Property Inns of Court
in 2007.
15. Patentees might seek treble damages or an injunction if the license is terminated. 35
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First, the patentee would still have the benefit of other license provisions, such as use
restrictions. Second, the patentee would not need to prove a damages amount, which
can be costly. Third, the increased royalty would have more certainty in the amount of
damages.
Licensees might prefer such clauses for the same reason: they would still have the
benefit of a license (rather than injunction risk) and the increased payments resulting
from a failed challenge would be certain, even if undesired. Accordingly, these
strategies are mutually beneficial and desirable to decrease the patent-challenge tax.
The Article concludes by highlighting some of the broader policy issues associated
with the tax and its components. While eliminating bad patents is an admirable goal,
there is a real cost to preempting private ordering. Future consideration of challenge
rights should take the model proposed in this Article into account, such that challenges
are targeted in such a way to incentivize technology innovation and licensing.
I.INALIENABLE PATENT CHALLENGE RIGHTS
Federal patent licensing policy, which preempts state contract law, leads to a
surprising rule: no prelitigation patent license is final, leaving licensees free to
potentially avoid royalties at any time.16 Three Supreme Court cases 17 and their
progeny allow the licensee the option to challenge, and thus escape, enforcement of a
license. Uncontradicted Supreme Court and courts of appeals opinions support this8
proposition yet, surprisingly, many continue to view it as unsettled or even untrue.'
This Part examines the case law at issue and refutes arguments that the law is unsettled.
A. The Unfettered Right to Challenge
The first case is Brulotte v. Thys Co., which held that a patent license covering an
expired patent is void.19 The BrulotteCourt made clear that "any attempted reservation
or continuation in the patentee or those claiming under him of the patent monopoly,
after the patent expires, whatever the legal device employed, runs counter to the policy
and purpose of the patent laws."'20 This rationale has been applied to void licenses to
any invalid patent, whether or not it was the licensee that challenged the patent.2'
U.S.C. §284. As a result, equal deterrent effectiveness means that these additional remedies are
offset by lower chances of winning such remedies.
16. Postlitigation settlement agreements may be considered res judicata and in some cases
cannot be challenged by the settling licensee. See Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362,
1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Interdynamics, Inc. v. Firma Wolf, 653 F.2d 93, 96-97 (3d Cir. 1981)
(en bane); Wallace Clark & Co. v. Acheson Indus., Inc., 532 F.2d 846, 849 (2d Cir. 1976);
Marine Travelift, Inc. v. Acme Marine Hoist, Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q. 293, 294 (E.D.N.Y. 1980);
Diematic Mfg. Corp. v. Packaging Indus., Inc., 412 F. Supp. 1367, 1369-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
17. See Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007); Lear v. Adkins, 395
U.S. 100 (1969); Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964).

18. See, e.g., M. Natalie Alfaro, Comment, Barring Validity Challenges Through NoChallenge Clauses and Consent Judgments: MedImmune's Revival of the Lear Progeny, 45
Hous. L. REv. 1277, 1283 (2008) ("[T]his Comment suggests history holds the answers to these
unsettled issues."). This Article uses "no-challenge" and "no-contest" interchangeably.
19. 379 U.S. at 29.
20. Id.at 31 (quoting Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 256 (1945)).
21. See Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653,667 (1969). Indeed, this was the law in at least one
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Brulotte was extended in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.22 to cover

noninfringed patents: "the patentee [may not] seek to extend the monopoly of his
patent to derive a benefit not attributable to use of the patent's teachings. 23 These
cases mean that licensees need not pay royalties if the patent under license is invalid or
not infringed.
The second case is Learv. Adkins, which held that entering into a license agreement
does not estop the licensee from challenging patent validity. 24 Prior to Lear, state
contract law held that a licensee could not simultaneously claim that a patent was
invalid, yet contract for its use. 25 The Court, however, held that invalidating bad
patents is too important a goal to limit validity challenges in this manner, especially
where the licensee is often the only party with economic incentive to challenge the
patent.26 Thus, Lear set forth a policy that licensees should be "unmuzzled" by their
contracts and given every incentive to challenge the patent.27
In the years after its issuance, regional circuits extended Lear to hold that any
impediment to a patent challenge is void.28 Several cases, for29example, hold that a
licensee's covenant not to challenge a patent is unenforceable.
circuit
1933).
22.
23.
24.

long before Lear. See Drackett Chem. Co. v. Chamberlain Co., 63 F.2d 853 (6th Cir.
395 U.S. 100 (1969).
Id.
at 136.
Lear, 395 U.S. at 670.

25. See id. at 668.

26. Id.at 670. For a critique of Lear, see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, DethroningLear:
Licensee Estoppel and the Incentive to Innovate, 72 VA. L. REv. 677 (1986).

27. Lear, 395 U.S. at 670-71 ("Licensees may often be the only individuals with enough
economic incentive to challenge the patentability of an inventor's discovery. If they are
muzzled, the public may continually be required to pay tribute to would-be monopolists without
need or justification. We think it plain that the technical requirements of contract doctrine must
give way before the demands of the public interest .. ").
Rochelle Dreyfuss points out that
holding licensees to their agreements would create an even larger incentive to challenge patents
early because the alternative is being stuck with royalty payments for the life of the patent.
Dreyfuss, supranote 26, at 755-56; see also Dreyfuss & Pope, supranote 9, at 990 ("[W]hen
the licensee's freedom to challenge the patent is curtailed, the public exchanges the benefit ofan
unmuzzled licensee for a different benefit--encouraging licensees to examine the strength of the
patents they license at the time they negotiate their agreements.").
28. See Timely Prods., Inc. v. Costanzo, 465 F. Supp. 91,96 (D. Conn. 1979) (holding that
a fifty percent royalty reduction is insufficient incentive to challenge a patent even if tied to
trade secrets: "[O]nce a patent issues, Learprecludes enforcement of any contract provision that
eliminates the licensee's incentive to challenge the patent's validity."); see also Dreyfuss, supra
note 26, at 700 (analyzing how certain courts are interpreting and expanding Lear); cf Zila, Inc.
v. Tinnell, 502 F.3d 1014, 1021 (9th Cir. 2007) ("[A] contract that provides for royalties either
when a patent expires or when it fails to issue cannot be upheld unless it provides a discount
from the alternative, patent-protected rate.").
29. See, e.g., Crane Co. v. Aeroquip Corp., 504 F.2d 1086, 1092-93 (7th Cir. 1974);
Panther Pumps & Equip. Co. v. Hydrocraft, Inc., 468 F.2d 225, 230-32 (7th Cir. 1972),
vacated, 566 F.2d 8 (7th Cir. 1977); Massillon-Cleveland-Akron Sign Co. v. Golden State
Adver. Co., 444 F.2d 425,427 (9th Cir. 1971); Bus. Forms Finishing Serv., Inc. v. Carson, 452
F.2d 70, 75 (7th Cir. 1971); Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms., Inc. 228 F. Supp. 2d 467, 473-74
(D. Del. 2002); Robintech, Inc. v. Chemidus Wavin, Ltd., 450 F. Supp. 817, 821 (D.D.C. 1978);
Wallace Clark & Co. v. Acheson Indus., Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 366 F. Supp. 220,232-34
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Despite the extension of Lear by regional circuits, the Federal Circuit3 ° recently
created an important limitation on Lear-based prohibitions. 31 It instituted the
"reasonable apprehension" test, which barred licensees from challenging patent
validity unless they had a reasonable apprehension they would be sued by the
patentee. 32 The rule's practical result was that licensees were forced to breach their
33
license agreements by stopping royalty payments before suing to invalidate a patent.
Breaching the license put licensees at risk for patent infringement damages, including
willful-infringement enhancements and attorneys' fees awards.
Licensee objections to the reasonable-apprehension test led to the third key
Supreme Court case, MedImmune v. Genentech, which held that patentees need not
have a reasonable apprehension, and thus need not breach the license agreement to
challenge the licensed patent. 34 The Medimmune Court ruled that a licensee's claim
that contract royalties should cease is a sufficient controversy to warrant federal
even if the licensee continues to pay royalties during the
declaratory reliefjurisdiction
35
pendency of the litigation.
In MedImmune, the licensee sought declaratory relief that no royalties were owed
on two grounds: (1) no royalty was due on invalid patents, and (2) no royalty was due
on noninfringing products.36 The Court ruled, quite simply, that because MedImmune
faced the threat of an infringement action if it stopped paying royalties in accordance
with its claimed rights, the controversy supported declaratory-relief jurisdiction in
federal court. 37 The Medlmmune ruling means that a licensee can always challenge the
(E.D. Pa. 1973), affd, 510 F.2d 334 (3d Cir. 1975); Blohm-Voss AG v. Prudential-Grace Lines,
Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1116, 1141 (D. Md. 1972), rev'd on othergrounds, 489 F.2d 231 (4th Cir.
1973); Kraly v. Nat'l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1349, 1352 (N.D. Ill. 1970), affd,
502 F.2d 1366 (7th Cir. 1974); Plastic Contact Lens Co. v. W. R. S. Contact Lens Labs., Inc.,
330 F. Supp. 441,43 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) ("Each such defendant likewise violated the no-contest
covenant of the respective license agreements, but that covenant does not estop defendants from
challenging the patent's validity."); Rialto Prods., Inc. v. Raytex Corp., 166 U.S.P.Q. 222, 222
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970).
30. The Federal Circuit was created in 1982 to hear all patent appeals. 28 U.S.C. §
1295(a)(4)(A) (2006); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800,820 (1988).
While contract issues are technically not appealable to the Federal Circuit, they often wind up
there because they are pendant with patent-infringement issues. Id. § 1338(a).
31. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see
O'Connor, supra note 9, at 423-24.
32. SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1379 (explaining that prior to Medlmmune a two-part test was
used that "first considers whether conduct by the patentee creates a reasonable apprehension on
the part of the declaratory judgment plaintiff that it will face an infringement suit, and second
examines whether conduct by the declaratory judgment plaintiff amounts to infringing activity
or demonstrates concrete steps taken with the intent to conduct such activity").
33. Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Lear left this
question open, as the licensee there had in fact breached its agreement. Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S.
653, 659 (1969).
34. Medlmmune, 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007).

35. Id. at 134. The Federal Circuit now merely requires a "definite and concrete" dispute as
set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006). Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Guardian Media Techs., Ltd., 497
F.3d 1271,1283 (Fed. Cir. 2007). For a critique of Medmmune, see O'Connor, supra note 9, at
429-43.

36. 549 U.S. at 123.
37. Id. at 134.
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license by arguing invalidity or noninfringement, and the patentee who disagrees is
subject to the court's jurisdiction to determine who is right.38
The practical consequence ofthese three cases is that a company threatened with an
infringement action can: (1) enter into a license agreement to avoid being sued for
infringement, (2) sue the patentee to void the license, 39 and (3) simultaneously pay
royalties to avoid being sued for infringement during (and after) the challenge. This
combination of rules allows the4 licensee to eliminate damage and injunction risk even
while it challenges the patent. 0
B. Arguments that the Challenge Right Is Unsettled
1. Arguments that No-Challenge Clauses are Enforceable
Some might argue that it is unsettled whether a no-challenge clause is void under
current law.41 For example, many licenses include no-contest provisions. 42 Even iftrue
as a matter of practice, this belief appears to be unsupported legally.43 Cases in several
circuits make clear that no-contest clauses are void. 44 Those opinions rely not only on
Lear(which does not actually hold that such clauses are void), but also on several prior
Supreme Court decisions, including an 1892 decision that explicitly held a no-contest
clause void.45

38. See Dreyfuss &Pope, supra note 9, at 971-73 ("By arguably opening the federal courts
to patent challenges by licensees-indeed, by anyone with a substantial investment in the
technology covered by the patent-Medmmune appears to create new avenues for courts to
police the implementation of patent law .... As such, it extends the rationale of Lear ..
(footnote omitted)).
39. A licensee can also seek declaratory judgment that it does not practice the patent and
thus is not liable for royalties. But see Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 9, at 981 ("[T]he [post-

Medlmmune Federal Circuit] has been able to protect patent holders from abusive practices.").
40. Of course, the licensee continues to pay royalties for the "right" to avoid this risk.
However, to the extent those royalties must be put in escrow or refunded by the patentee from
the date of the challenge (as discussed below), then any such payment is illusory.
41. See, e.g., Alfaro, supra note 18, at 1283.
42. Id. at 1304 ("Moreover, if courts choose to follow the Federal Circuit's understanding
of no-challenge clauses, patentees will likely invoke contractual estoppel despite the policies of
Lear and MedImmune.").
43. Kuwahara & Lavey, supra note 9, at 156-58 (noting the unenforceability of nochallenge clauses, and arguing that such clauses are barred under free trade agreements as well);
Miller, supra note 4, at 3-4.
44. See supra note 29.
45. Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394,402 (1947) (stating
that a no-challenge provision "can no more override congressional policy than can an implied
estoppel"); Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224,233-34 (1892). Butsee Steiner Sales Co.
v. Schwartz Co., 98 F.2d 999, 1009-10 (10th Cir. 1938) (distinguishing Pope and stating that
no-challenge provision are enforceable); Eskimo Pie Corp. v. Nat'l Ice Cream Co., 26 F.2d
901,902 (6th Cir. 1928) (stating (in a pre-Learcase) that "[t]here is no occasion to doubt that a
licensee may lawfully agree not to contest the patent at any time during its term, or that, even
after such a license had been terminated by the licensor for the licensee's default, the rights
which the licensee had acquired by the contract would have been a valid consideration for this
unlimited agreement not to contest... ").
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It is unclear where the belief that the law is unsettled originates, but there are a
couple of possibilities. First, the cases striking such clauses are for the most part more
than twenty-five years old, predating the Federal Circuit. Few cases since 1982 address
the issue, 4 6 and most of those cases are limited to a very particular circumstancewhether no-contest clauses are void as part of consent judgments or settlement
agreements that terminate litigation.47 No court considering an ordinary license has
upheld such a provision.
The potential argument about the rule's age is also affected by the Federal Circuit,
which now decides most of these questions and largely ignores regional circuit law on
the subject.4 8 The Federal Circuit has not directly addressed the issue of whether nochallenge clauses are unenforceable.
In any event, recent developments in jurisdictional rules make it less likely that the
Federal Circuit will hear cases and apply its own law to no-challenge clauses.
Declaratory-relief actions pleaded as contract disputes may not be appealable to the
Federal Circuit.49 Indeed, they may not even need to be brought in federal court at all
because contractual issues are considered state-law issues.50 As a result, licensees

46. See, e.g., Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms., 228 F. Supp. 2d 467, 773 (D. Del. 2002).
47. See Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Foster v.
Hallco Mfg. Co., Inc., 947 F.2d 469, 475 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also J. Thomas McCarthy,
"Unmuzzling " the Patent Licensee: Chaos in the Wake of Lear v. Adkins, 45 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 429, 486 (1977); Alfaro, supra note 18, at 1281-82; cf Idaho Potato Comm'n v. M & M
Produce Farm & Sales, 335 F.3d 130, 135-36 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing patent history in
context of trademark consent judgment).
48. Flex-Foot,238 F.3d at 1365 (applying Federal Circuit law to contract issues). Compare
id. at 1370 ("Upholding the terms of settlement agreements encourages patent owners to agree
to settlements and promotes judicial economy."), with Massillon-Cleveland-Akron Sign Co. v.
Golden State Adver. Co., 444 F.2d 425, 427 (9th Cir. 1971) ("We think it unimportant that in
our case the covenant is part of a settlement agreement rather than of a typical patent licensing
agreement.").
49. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vomado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830 (2002)
(suit for trade dress infringement not appealable to Federal Circuit and counterclaim for patent
infringement does not confer jurisdiction); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486
U.S. 800, 809 (1988) ("Thus, a case raising a federal patent-law defense does not, for that
reason alone, 'arise under' patent law, 'even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff's
complaint, and even if both parties admit that the defense is the only question truly at issue in
the case."') (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. Constr. Laborors Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 14
(1983)); Wang Labs, Inc. v. Applied Computer Scis., Inc., 926 F.2d 92, 93 n.3 (1st Cir. 1991);
Boggild v. Kenner Prods., 853 F.2d 465, 468 (6th Cir. 1988) (Federal Circuit did not have
exclusive jurisdiction of appeal in breach of licensing agreement suit); George C. Best, Licensee
Estoppel Revisited, INTELL. PROP. L. NEwSL. (ABA Section of Intellectual Property Law), Spring
2007, at 1, 27-28; Christopher A. Cotropia, "Arising Under" Jurisdictionand Uniformity in
Patent Law, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 253, 298-99 (2003).
50. Consider that Lear was an appeal from the California Supreme Court. Lear, Inc. v.
Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 655-56 (1969); see also Luckett v. Delpark, Inc., 270 U.S. 496, 502
(1926); RCA Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("Nor does [Lear]
deal with a licensor's right to terminate or rescind a license agreement, or dictate what must be
held a breach of contract, or what damages must be awarded for a breach, or under what
circumstances, if any, a licensee can recover royalties paid. Those questions continue to be
matters dependent on particular fact situations, contract provisions and state contract law, albeit
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wishing to avoid Federal Circuit law might seek declaratory judgment that no royalties
are owed under the contract, making the matter contractual. 51
A second possible basis for the belief that the law is unsettled is a brief passage in
MedImmune that implies that contracts may govern if a no-challenge clause or
settlement agreement were explicitly negotiated. 52 After all, there are other areas where
53
the law will enforce no-challenge provisions, such as no contest provisions in wills.
Indeed, criminal defendants are held to their agreements to waive appeals of plea
54
bargain agreements, despite the fundamental constitutional rights that may be waived.
Nonetheless, while the Court currently appears to favor private ordering,55 given
Supreme Court precedent (and a lack of a circuit split) on the question, MedImmune's
dicta will likely not change well-settled law in the near future even if such a change
might be socially optimal.56 The Court has long held that certain patent policies

they must be resolved in harmony with general principles discernible from Lear."); Carding
Specialists (Canada), Ltd. v. Gunter & Cooke, Inc., 214 S.E.2d 233, 236 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975)
(state court ruling on enforceability of contract and patent validity); Cotropia, supra,note 49, at,
299-300; Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 9, at 1004 ("For instance, if the license continues, the
patent holder can characterize the case as a contract dispute, and bring the action in state (rather
than federal) court."); Alfaro, supra note 18, at 1286 n.56.
51. Cf MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 123-24 (2007) (holding that
declaratory-relief action relates to contractual rights and obligations, not "freestanding patent
invalidity"). While a contract may require payment of royalties until a patent is declared invalid
by a court, an action need not be for invalidity, but instead for declaratory relief that no royalties
are owed. If a state court must declare the patent invalid to reach that result, then it has
jurisdiction to do so. While a contract might condition royalties on a declaration of invalidity by
a federal court, contracts cannot dictate subject matter jurisdiction.
52. Id. at 135 ("Promising to pay royalties on patents that have not been held invalid does
not amount to a promise not to seek a holding of their invalidity."); see also Dreyfuss & Pope,
supra note 9, at 976 ("Moreover, by specifically noting that 'it is not clear where [in the
contract] the prohibition against challenging the validity of patents is found,' the Court implied
that if it had found a no-contest provision, it would have enforced it." (quoting MedImmune,
549 U.S. at 135) (alteration in original)); Schlicher, supra note 5, at 388.
53. Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Reducing Estate and Trust Litigation Through Disclosure,In
Terrorem Clauses, MediationandArbitration,9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 237,246(2008)
("Some states, such as California and New York, enforce [no-contest clauses] without
limitation. In general, states that have adopted the Uniform Probate Code, enforce disinheritance
provisions only if the objectant did not have a reasonable basis to object to the admission of the
Will to probate. Other states, such as Florida, do not enforce them." (footnote omitted)).
54. FED R. CRIM. P. I1(b)(1)(N); Derek Teeter, Comment, A ContractsAnalysis of Waivers
of the Right to Appeal in Criminal Plea Bargains, 53 U. KAN. L. REv. 727, 738 (2005)
("[E]very federal circuit court has held [appeal] waivers theoretically valid.").
55. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109,2122 (2008) (implying
that patent exhaustion might not apply if license agreement forbade downstream sales); see also
Taylor, supra note 12, at 238-39 (criticizing cases that bar no-challenge clauses as giving
insufficient weight to the importance of contracts). But see id. at 2122 n.7 ("[W]e express no
opinion on whether contract damages might be available even though exhaustion operates to
eliminate patent damages.").
56. For an analysis of the state of the law after MedImmune, see Alfaro, supra note 18, at
1283 ("The MedImmune ruling effectively returns the law to the state it was in between the Lear
decision in 1969 and the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982."). But see Dreyfiss & Pope,
supra note 9, at 976 ("Thus, while Lear is understood as prohibiting the enforcement of any
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preempt state contractual law;5 7 even probate and criminal laws impose some limits on
no challenge agreements despite being generally upheld.
2. Arguments That One May Not Simultaneously Pay Royalties and Challenge a
Patent
Alternatively, some might argue that a party must stop paying royalties to challenge
validity, MedImmune notwithstanding,58 such that a licensee may not challenge a patent
while receiving the license's protection.
While the common law rule was that one may not challenge a contract while
simultaneously obtaining its benefits,5 9 that rule lacks strong legal support under
current law.60 It is true that one Federal Circuit case, Studiengesellschaft Kohle,
MB.H. v. Shell Oil Co., appeared to apply the common law rule. 6 1 However, reading
Shell Oil as limiting the right to challenge after MedImmune is a bit optimistic for a
few reasons.

contract provision that reduces the licensee's incentive to challenge validity, MedImmune can be
interpreted as permitting patent holders to bargain for such restrictions." (footnote omitted)).
57. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964).
58. See Bleeker & O'Shaughnessy, supranote 9, at 426-27; see also Medlmmune, 549 U.S.
at 124 ("We express no opinion on whether a nonrepudiatinglicensee is similarly relieved of its
contract obligation during a successful challenge to a patent's validity-that is, on the
applicability of licensee estoppel under these circumstances. Cf. StudiengesellschaflKohle, m. b.
H. v. Shell Oil Co., 112 F.3d 1561, 1568 (CA Fed. 1997) ..." (emphasis in original)); id.
at
136 ("In short, Article III jurisdiction has nothing to do with this 'insurance-policy'
contention.").
59. See, e.g., Victory Bottle Capping Mach. Co. v. 0. & J. Mach. Co., 280 F. 753, 761 (1st
Cir. 1922); Jones v. Burnham, 67 Me. 93 (1877). But see Freeman v. Altvater, 129 F.2d 494,
497 (8th Cir. 1942) (license termination based on invalidity affirmed despite payment of
royalties under protest), rev'd in part, 319 U.S. 359, 364-66 (1943) (royalties paid "under
protest" under challenged license agreement and injunction did not bar invalidity challenge on
jurisdictional grounds) on remand, 138 F.2d 854, 856 (8th Cir. 1943) (affirming district court
finding of invalidity, despite payments under protest).
60. Kuwahara & Lavey, supranote 9, at 157.
In MedImmune, the Supreme Court did not decide whether a non-repudiating
licensee would be subject to licensee estoppel, but clearly did not intend to reverse
or narrow Pope or Lear. Since the Supreme Court noted that a licensee's promise
"to pay royalties on patents that have not been held invalid does not amount to a
promise not to seek a holding of their invalidity," it is likely that non-repudiating
licensees would not be subject to licensee estoppel.
Id. (citation omitted).
On remand, the district court in Med/mmune came to the same conclusion and allowed the
nonrepudiating licensee to challenge the patent: "The distinction that MedImmune is a
nonrepudiating licensee is insufficient to depart from Lear's analysis." MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1018 (C.D, Cal. 2008). Butsee Hull v. Brunswick Corp.,
704 F.2d 1195, 1203 (10th Cir. 1983) (requiring royalty cessation during pendency creates
social value by forcing patentee to not stall adjudication).
61. 112 F.3d 1561, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("However, a licensee, such as Shell, cannot
invoke the protection of the Lear doctrine until it (i) actually ceases payment of royalties, and
(ii) provides notice to the licensor that the reason for ceasing payment of royalties is because it
has deemed the relevant claims to be invalid.").
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First, Shell Oil is a precursor to the "reasonable apprehension" cases reversed in
MedImmune. 62 Thus, any further reliance on it will require untangling the "reasonable
apprehension" aspects of the analysis from the "right to challenge" aspects.
Second, Shell Oil is about when royalty obligations cease after a challenge, not
about a requirement to stop paying royalties before a challenge.63 When the Court ruled
that licensees could challenge, Lear considered when the challenger's duty to pay
royalties stopped; it held that a court could not require a licensee to pay royalties after
a successful validity challenge. 64 It left the 65
lower courts to determine when royalties
should terminate on a successful challenge.
In turn, the circuits are nearly unanimous post-Lear,including the very cases cited
in Shell Oil, that royalty obligations cease upon "clear notice" 66 of an "early
adjudication of validity ' 67 by a nonrepudiating licensee. Ceasing obligations at the time

of such clear notice gives an incentive for early challenges, but it is not enough. These
cases hold that it 6is the notice-not royalty cessation-that triggers the right to
challenge a patent. 8

62. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 134. Gen-Probe,which was reversed by MedImmune, held
that a patent license "unless materially breached, obliterated any reasonable apprehension of a
lawsuit," thus barring declaratory-relief jurisdiction. Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d
1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
63. See Shell Oil, 112 F.3d at 1562.
64. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653,674 (1969) ("[E]nforcing this contractual provision
would undermine the strong federal policy favoring the full and free use of ideas in the public
domain. For all these reasons, we hold that Lear must be permitted to avoid the payment of all
royalties accruing after Adkins' 1960 patent issued if Lear can prove patent invalidity.").
65. Id. at 674-75.
66. See, e.g., Rite-Nail Packaging Corp. v. Berryfast, Inc., 706 F.2d 933, 937 (9th Cir.
1983) ("The licensee must clearly notify the licensor that the licensee is challenging the patent's
validity.").
67. See, e.g., PPG Indus., Inc. v. Westwood Chem., Inc., 530 F.2d 700,706 (6th Cir. 1976)
("Something more than mere nonpayment is required to 'encourage an early adjudication of
invalidity."' (quoting Troxel Mfg. Co. v. Schwinn Bicycle Co. 465 F.2d 1253, 1257 (6th Cir.
1972)) (emphasis in original)).
68. Rite-NailPackaging,706 F.2d at 936 ("[A] licensee under an invalid patent may not be
required to pay royalties which accrue under the license agreement after the licensee 'takes an
affirmative step that would prompt the early adjudication of the validity of the patent, such as
filing an action contesting the patent's validity or notifying the licensor that the payments were
being stopped because the patent was believed to be invalid."' (quoting Bristol Locknut Co. v.
SPS Techs, 677 F.2d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir. 1982)) (emphasis added)); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v.
Allied Chem. Corp., 567 F.2d 184, 187 (2d Cir. 1977) ("Addressing the question whether a
patent licensee must actually withhold royalty payments before he can challenge validity, we
conclude as have most courts who have considered the issue that such repudiation of the
licensing agreement should not be precondition to suit."); see also Hull v. Brunswick Corp., 704
F.2d 1195, 1204 (10th Cir. 1983) ("Limiting the royalties licensees can avoid to those accruing
after the licensees effectively notify the licensors that they question the validity of the licensed
patents prevents the rule in Lear from being used to frustrate the policies enunciated there.");
Bristol Locknut Co. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 677 F.2d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir. 1982); PPGIndus.,Inc.,
530 F.2d at 706; Am. Sterilizer Co. v. Sybron Corp., 526 F.2d 542, 543 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding
that a licensee need not terminate license to challenge patent and may also cease paying
royalties); Kraly v. Nat'l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 502 F.2d 1366, 1372 (7th Cir. 1974).
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While the Federal Circuit applies its own law on this question rather than following
regional circuits, 69 prior Federal Circuit law adopted the view that validity could be
challenged without repudiating the license.70 Shell Oil does not purport to overrule
these prior cases.
In fact, like its regional counterparts, the Federal Circuit in Shell Oil was faced with
the very issue left to it by Lear: a licensee failed to pay royalties, but did not challenge
the patent until years later, after the patentee sued for breach of contract. 71 Like prior
cases, Shell Oil discussed the importance of "early challenge" as the trigger for when
the licensee's duty to pay royalties ends.72 Even though the licensee stopped paying
royalties, the Court held that the licensee owed back royalties until the date of
challenge because it did not make an early challenge. 73 Therefore, the Shell Oil court
decided the date the duty to pay royalties ceased for failure to challenge; it did not
decide when the right to challenge accrued.
As a result, Shell Oil represents only weak dicta that a licensee cannot challenge a
patent while continuing to pay royalties. Instead, its holding is more in line with every
other court to consider the matter: the duty to pay royalties on an invalid patent ceases
at the time of a challenge.
The most that could be argued post-Medlmmune is that nonrepudiating challenging
licensees need not pay royalties during the pendency of the challenge. For example, a
nonrepudiating licensee might argue that royalties should be put in escrow at the time
of lawsuit74 or that the patentee must return to the licensee all royalties paid after

69. Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Shell Oil, 112 F.3d
at 1567-68. The Federal Circuit's refusal to apply regional circuit law is another reason that one
should not put too much stock in its rulings on this subject, because regional circuits may begin
hearing more appeals. See, e.g., Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535
U.S. 826, 830 (2002) (ruling that patent-related counterclaims do not necessitate appeal to the
Federal Circuit).
70. See Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 780 F.2d 991, 994-96 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding
that licensee may cease paying royalties at its option and risk infringement counterclaim, but
court cannot force payment of fees into escrow); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, 716 F.2d 874, 880
(Fed. Cir. 1983) ("To always require the termination of a license agreement as aprecondition to
suit would mean that a licensee must then bear the risk of liability of infringement. This would
discourage licensees from contesting patent validity and would be contrary to the policies
expressed in Lear.").
71. Shell Oil, 112 F.3d at 1561.
72. Id.at 1568 ("Just as important, however, Shell's apparent breach of its duty to notify
under the agreement is itself more likely to frustrate federal patent policy than enforcement of
the contract."); see also MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1018 (C.D.
Cal. 2008) (describing Shell Oil as relating to date of first challenge, rather than about
requirement of ceasing royalties).
73. Shell Oil, 112 F.3d at 1568 ("[Tlhis court detects no significant frustration of federal
patent policy by enforcing the 1987 license agreement between Shell and SGK, to the extent of
allowing SGK to recover royalties until the date Shell first challenged the validity of the claims
....
By abrogating its notification duty, Shell delayed a timely challenge to the validity of the
'698 patent and postponed the public's full and free use of the invention of the '698 patent.").
74. See Hull v. Brunswick Corp., 704 F.2d 1195, 1203 (10th Cir. 1983) (requiring royalty
cessation during pendency creates social value by forcing patentee to not stall adjudication);
Am. Sterilizer Co. v. Sybron Corp., 526 F.2d 542, 547-48 (3d Cir. 1975) (licensee need not
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initiation of the challenge if the licensee wins. 75 Each of these scenarios is consistent
with Shell Oil: the licensee's duty ceases at the time of challenge, though legal
cessation is contingent on actually winning the challenge.
In any event, uncertainty about the right to challenge, as well as the possibility that
fees may be escrowed, is incorporated into the economic model and the discussion that
follows.
3. Arguments That Licenses Covering Invalid and Noninfringing Patents Are Still
Enforceable
Some argue that MedImmune's limited holding implies that patent licenses that do
not explicitly condition royalties on validity or infringement might still be
enforceable. 76 To be sure, Medlmmune does focus on the contractual disagreement,
giving hope to the optimistic that perhaps the Court will enforce contracts that do not
limit themselves to valid and infringed patents: "All we need determine is whether
petitioner has alleged a contractual dispute. It has done So.",77 It is possible that the
Court will reverse course in the future, but the law is currently settled that a patent may
not be enforced if it is invalid and noninfringed, regardless of contract language. 7 ' The
terminate license to challenge patent and may also cease paying royalties); Atlas Chem. Indus.,
Inc. v. Moraine Prods., 509 F.2d 1, 4-7 (6th Cir. 1974) (affirming payment of royalties into
escrow); Dreyfiss & Pope, supra note 9, at 983 ("Some practitioners have suggested that
royalties be paid into an escrow account .. ");
cf O'Connor, supranote 9, at 446 (discussing
how nonrepudiating licensees might only be liable for royalties arising between the time a patent
is challenged and final adjudication, if they lose a challenge).
75. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 567 F.2d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 1977)
(denying licensee request to escrow, but noting that royalties may have to be refunded if licensee
wins challenge).
76. See Schlicher, supranote 5, at 371 ("Therefore, patent owners should not be subject to
a MedImmune declaratoryjudgment action, if they used a definition of royalty-bearing products
that did not refer to validity."). Schlicher even recommends that parties remove all provisions in
their licenses that make royalty obligations dependent on patent validity. Id.at 385; see also
Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 9, at 987-89 (arguing that modem antitrust jurisprudence implies
that Brulotte and Lear have less applicability today and may be overruled).
77. Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 125 (2007). But see id. at 123 ("At
the outset, we address a disagreement concerning the nature of the dispute at issue herewhether it involves only a freestanding claim of patent invalidity or rather a claim that, both
because of patent invalidity and because of noninfringement, no royalties are owing under the
license agreement. That probably makes no difference to the ultimate issue of subject-matter
jurisdiction, but it is well to be clear about the nature of the case before us.").
78. See Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653,673 (1969) ("Thus, it may be suggested that although
Lear must be allowed to raise the question of patent validity in the present lawsuit, it must also
be required to comply with its contract and continue to pay royalties until its claim is finally
vindicated in the courts. The parties' contract, however, is no more controlling on this issue than
is the State's doctrine of estoppel, which is also rooted in contract principles. The decisive
question is whether overriding federal policies would be significantly frustrated if licensees
could be required to continue to pay royalties during the time they are challenging patent
validity in the courts. It seems to us that such a requirement would be inconsistent with the aims
of federal patent policy."). But see Schlicher, supranote 5, at 372 (arguing that Lear only voids
a contract if third parties challenge a patent). While creative, Schlicher's argument is
unsupported by any subsequent decision and contradicted by many. See, e.g., Hemstreet v.
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reason so many contracts include language that terminates royalties on an invalidity or
noninfringement finding is that attempting to enforce such a void contract is also
considered patent misuse and potentially even an antitrust infraction.79
It is unlikely that Medlmmune will be limited to contract disputes. The declaratory
judgment statute is clear that any controversy can trigger jurisdiction, 80 and a licensee's
claim that a license is void for patent misuse is sufficient. Indeed, the Federal Circuit
has already applied the rule to noncontract-related declaratory relief 8 ' Thus,
attempting to avoid the risks discussed here by eliminating contract language about
validity and infringement will likely have no effect on the risks of challenge.
II. THE PATENT-CHALLENGE TAX AND ROYALTY INFLATION
This Part explores the economic model that is fully developed in Appendix I. It
begins with a description of what negotiated royalties might look like if patent licenses
were final. Next, it describes the patent-challenge tax and provides the variables that
might increase or decrease the tax. The discussion ends with some comments on how
the tax affects social welfare and who winds up paying the tax.
A. RationalPatentPricing
In addition to market-based factors,8 2 rational patent-licensing fees will incorporate
potential litigation risks. The royalty rate will include some discounting from dangers
that might be obtained in court because patentees will want to avoid prelicense
litigation. Stronger patents will be discounted less because litigation relief is more
likely.8 3 License fees should incorporate the avoidance of litigation costs such as

attorneys' and expert fees. 84 The royalty may reflect other discounts from a litigation
result, such as the licensee's avoidance of potential enhancements like willful

Spiegel, Inc., 851 F.2d 348, 350 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (settlement agreement enforceable even
though patent determined unenforceable in a case involving a different party); Atlas, 509 F.2d at
4-7 (discussing purpose of Learto allow licensees to challenge patents, not just third parties).
79. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135 (1969); Handgards,
Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that knowingly attempting to
enforce invalid patent can be antitrust violation); Transitron Elec. Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co.,
487 F. Supp. 885, 893 (D. Mass. 1980) (attempting to enforce invalid patent is misuse).
80. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006); see also Kuwahara & Lavey, supra note 9, at 156
(discussing effect of Medlmmune on existing license agreements).
81. See Cat Tech LLC v. TubeMaster, Inc., 528 F.3d 871, 878-83 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
82. In addition to market factors, holdup issues may affect royalty rates. Mark A.Lemley &
Carl Shapiro, PatentHoldup andRoyalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REv. 1991, 2002-03 (2007). But
see Einer Elhauge, Do PatentHoldup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically Excessive

Royalties?, 4 J.COMPEITION L. & EcON. 535 (2008).
83. Schlicher, supra note 5, at 373. But see Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 82, at 2001
(arguing that weaker patents have less litigation discount).

84. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 82, at 2001 (firms will litigate when costs are low but
redesign costs are high). But see Ranganath Sudarshan, Nuisance-Value Patent Suits: An
Economic Model and Proposal, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER& HIGH TECH. L.J. 159,171(2008)
("According to first principles, a patent's value ought not be controlled by the auxiliary metric
of how much it costs to defend against it in an infringement suit.").
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infringement damages or attorneys' fee-shifting
awards.8 5 This "baseline" license fee is
86
stream
royalty
a
of
value
the present
Allowing the licensee to challenge the patent may help invalidate bad patents,8 7 but
it does not necessarily help all licensees. Some licensees, for example, prefer peace to
litigation even ifthey believe the patent might be invalid.88 Other licensees may believe
that the patent is valid, and want to avoid the risk of treble damages and attorneys' fees
if the matter were litigated.
If a licensee and patentee could legally agree not to litigate, the properly priced
royalty would incorporate the costs and benefits of avoiding litigation given the
strength of the patent or the likelihood that the licensee would be found infringing.
Assuming each party has perfect information, risk-neutral patentees would agree
to a
89
royalty that is at least equal to the expected value of litigation, including costs.
B. The Patent-ChallengeTax
However, licensees cannot agree not to litigate; while they may communicate their
intentions, they cannot legally bind themselves not to challenge the patent after the
license is executed. Thus, the patentee will always perceive a chance, however small,
that the licensee will challenge the patent. 9° This chance decreases the expected value

85. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 82, at 2001. But see Sudarshan, supra note 84, at 161
(arguing that deep discounting is an indication of a nuisance license).

86. See infraApp. I, equation 2. Formal proof of the equations set forth in this Part appears
infra App. I.
87. The benefit of allowing licensee challenges is likely overstated. To be sure, licensees

have the largest incentive to seek invalidity, but if no other party has such incentive, then the
primary benefits would be limited to the single licensee. As discussed in the text, the licensee
pays for the right to challenge the patent, negating some, if not all, of those benefits. Further,
licensees may sue in order to renegotiate the royalty, which is a transfer of wealth that generates
transactions costs with no corresponding social benefit. Finally, patents will often remain in

effect after litigation. Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 9, at 974 (If the parties settle a challenge,
"the patent will remain in force. Accordingly, society will not gain free access to the
invention.").
88. Dreyfuss, supra note 26, at 703 ("Indeed, so long as the patentee does not extract all the
extra profit the licensee can charge, a licensee will almost always have as strong an interest as
the patentee in avoiding a patent challenge and will therefore not function in the public
interest."); Murray Fulton & Amalia Yiannaka, Strategic Licensing of ProductInnovations 3
(Am. Agric. Econ. Ass'n, Selected Paper 174930, 2007), availableat http://purl.umn.edu/9757
(licensing can maximize joint profits).
89. This Article uses probabilistic cost and benefit calculations. Mark A. Lemley & Carl
Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERsP., Spring 2005, at 75, 88-89 (2005)
(discussing probabilistic nature of patent licensing and challenge decisions).
90. The chance of challenge appears to be relatively small; there are no reports of
widespread patent challenges. The reason for this is unclear, but there are at least three possible
explanations. First, most licensees may really prefer peace, which makes credible signaling of
finality more important. Second, most existing royalties are less inflated because they were
negotiated before MedImmune. Thus, one might expect that royalties on weak patents are based
on litigation avoidance only. If the royalty is the same as, or just lower, than the cost of
litigation then licensees will be indifferent between paying royalties or suing. Because
MedImmune is relatively recent, the technology covered by post-MedImmune licenses may not
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of any royalty stream by imposing additional costs on the patentee, including potential
attorneys' fees and other litigation costs, potential loss of royalties, and interference
with other licenses if the patent is invalidated.9 1
These costs are essentially an excise tax on each patent license-a patent-challenge
tax.92 The tax effect is not eliminated because of its probabilistic nature, because
patentees and licensees consider potential outcomes.93 The costs of a patent challenge
are no less real to the patentee simply because there is a chance the challenge will not
occur. The true perceived costs seem especially concrete where the patentee holds
either many patents or many licenses because the patentee would consider the expected
results of many events before determining whether to enter one more license that could
cause the loss of all the others.
The patent-challenge tax is based on the following variables: s is the chance that a
licensee will sue; w is the chance that the patentee will win; r is the present value
royalties associated with the license; w' is the chance that the patentee's other licenses
are undisturbed (for example, a finding of validity but noninfringement); r' is the
present value associated with other licenses; e' represents the extra royalties that the
patentee might demand upon winning (e.g., due to having a stronger patent); 94 and c
represents litigation costs such as attorneys' fees and expert costs.
Examining the effect of these variables on the patentee reveals some intuitive
results. For example, the tax will grow as the chance of challenge (s) and the patentee's
cost of that challenge (c) increase. The tax also increases as royalties (r and r) go up
because the patentee has more to lose in case of challenge. However, it decreases as the
patentee's chances of winning the lawsuit (w and w') go up because it is more likely
that the patentee can retain royalties, and the patentee may even get a bonus by winning
(w'e) because a patent surviving a challenge will command more royalties from future
licensees.
A formal economic model for the tax is fully derived in Appendix I. The model
yields a tax that is the probability of a challenge (s) times the sum of: probable lost
royalties on the particular license ((1
w)r),95 probable lost royalties on other

be sufficiently developed to warrant challenges yet. If so, then the number of challenges would
be expected to increase in the future. Third, because challenges are a public good, there will
always be fewer of them than one might predict. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
91. Litigation costs may not be the only costs. For example, some cases allow the
challenging licensee to pay royalty payments in escrow rather than pay the patentee during the
course of litigation. See Dreyfuss, supranote 26, at 743 ("Because Learprohibits [a patentee]
from shifting certain business risks vertically, he must discount his expected income stream by
the probability that the licensee will avoid royalty payments by successfully challenging the
patent."); Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 9, at 973 ("The licensee can now seek a new
arrangement any time it can mount a credible contract dispute. Furthermore, it can do so without
taking any real risk, for if the patent is upheld, the licensee can continue to rely on the license.");
Taylor, supra note 12, at 240; see, e.g., Crane Co. v. Aeroquip Corp., 356 F. Supp. 733 (N.D.
I11.1973), modifiedon othergrounds, 504 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir. 1974).
92. The tax terminology is primarily for ease of reference. Whether one calls this a tax or
not, the results are the same.
93. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 89, at 88-89; cf Craswell, supra note 2, at 366-72
(discussing effect of probabilistic costs such as product liability and warranty costs).
94. O'Connor, supra note 9, at 445-46.
95. If w is the chance of winning, then I - w is the chance of losing.
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licenses if the patent is invalid ((1 - w)r), and anticipated litigation costs (c). 96 The
tax is decreased, however, by the chance of challenge and a win by the patentee, to the
extent that a win brings in additional royalties in future
licenses (-w'e). The formula is:
97
s[(] - w)r + (1 - wr' - w'e' + C].
The result of the tax is that the patentee's benefit from receiving any given license is
lower98 than it would be in the absence of challenge rights. 99 As compared to the world
before MedImmune, fewer licenses will be available for any given fee paid by the
licensee.1tu This leads to a deadweight loss that is no different than any other tax
imposed on the supply side of the market.' 0' A patentee will refuse to license when the
licensee's offered royalty minus the tax is less than the patentee's litigation outcome or
other minimum royalty (perhaps associated with the value of internal development).
02
Without the tax, the offered royalty would be above the patentee's minimum.'

96. Also considered is the patentee's inability to seek enhanced damages (for example,
treble damages) that are no longer available in a patent challenge because the challenger has a
license. This opportunity cost (swe) will be discussed in more detail with respect to licensing
strategies, but does not appear in this equation because the patentee presumably gives up the
right to seek such damages just by entering the license in the first place. Thus, the tax does not
include this opportunity cost.
97. See infra App. I, equation 29. This model could theoretically be empirically tested,
though doing so might be difficult at present due to the anecdotal nature of licensing negotiation
data, the confidential nature of many licenses, and the short time since MedImmune was
decided. An empirical test could be achieved by gathering licensing data before and after both
Medlmmune and Lear. The tests could hold licensing terms constant and observe changes in
royalties or it could hold royalties constant and observe changes in terms. A lack of observed
changes would still be a useful result. Because the costs unquestionably exist, unchanged royalty
and license terms would provide information about elasticity (or lack thereof) of supply and
demand, bounded rationality, and transactions costs. See, e.g., Craswell, supra note 2, at 367
(showing how different demand curves will lead to different price effects).
98. This assertion is technically not true all the time. It is possible that the potential
enhancement to royalties upon winning a challenge (w'e) is so large that patentees are actually
better off if the patent is challenged. This scenario is unlikely, however, because patentees
facing such an upside would likely litigate rather than accept licenses. See infraApp. I,equation
37.
99. Existing licenses are also less valuable, but in most cases they cannot be repriced, either
legally or practically. Cf Daryl Martin & David C. Drews, Intellectual Property Valuation
Techniques, 26 LICENsNG J., Oct. 2006, at 15, 19-20 (stating one way to value a patent is to
total royalties received on it).
100. Cf YoungJun Kim, Market Structureand Technology Licensing: Evidencefrom US.
Manufacturing, 11 APPLIED ECON. LErERS 631,635 (2004) (finding that simply having a pool

of patents does not mean that they will be licensed).
101. See Craswell, supra note 2, at 366-67 (describing deadweight loss associated with costs
imposed on sellers); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2, at 567 ("[Tlhe anticipation of [a court's
redistribution of the benefits of a contract] can destroy the parties' incentive scheme for
producing efficient specialized products. Further, the resources involved in negotiating the
modification or guarding against it constitute a deadweight loss that reduces the parties' joint
gain from the contract."). For a relatively clear explanation of tax-based deadweight loss, with
helpful graphs, see Thayer Watkins, The Impact of an Excise Tax or Subsidy on Price,
http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/taximpact.htm.
102. See Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 9, at 974 ("[Flewer deals will likely be made and

2010]

PATENT CHALLENGES AND ROYALTY INFLATION

1021

These costs are different than a traditional tax because the direct costs imposed on
patentees are not paid to a central authority, nor are they distributed to society at large;
instead, they are transferred in part to licensees of that very same patentee as a
subsidy. 10 3 For example, the patentee's potentially lost royalties are the licensee's
potentially avoided royalty payments. 1' 4 Transferring wealth from the patentee to
infringers should have the effect of reducing the deadweight loss because potential
10 5
infringers will be more willing to become licensees, thus increasing demand.
Distributionally, even with this demand shift not all licensees will be better off; only
those licensees that value the right to challenge more than the increase in royalties will
be better off.'0 6
It is unlikely that the demand shift will offset the deadweight loss completely. First,
some licensees may still license and challenge. Second, not all of the tax is paid to
licensees. For example, the patentee's litigation costs are not paid to any of the parties,
though they could be a subsidy paid to attorneys.
To further offset the deadweight loss, the challenge arguably provides a positive
externality in the form of social benefits created by invalidating bad patents; in theory,
saved royalties can be used for better investment than bad patents, whose innovation
need not be incentivized.107 By extension, to the extent that the reduction in patents and
available patent licenses means that there are fewer bad patents on the market, the
deadweight loss might be offset by sufficient benefits. Further, the ability to challenge
while retaining a license may provide a social benefit by eliminating the ability of
patentees to use the risk of an injunction to inflate royalties.10 8 The actual size ofthese
benefits, if any, is unknown.

fewer inventions will be put to socially-beneficial uses."); Jay, supranote 10, at 80 (challenge
right increases transactions costs, chilling technology transfer); Schlicher, supranote 5, at 381
("The law prevents licensing that should have occurred.").
103. Contract law is replete with similar subsidizing legal rules, such as implied warranties.
See generally Craswell, supranote 2.

104. Whether the loss to the patentee equals the gain to the licensee is a complicated
question. Because each license carries the risk of negating all sources of license revenue, each

new license bears a high cost to the patentee but a smaller benefit to the licensee.
105. Craswell, supra note 2, at 368 ("An implied warranty, however, would normally make a
product more attractive to consumers, thereby causing consumer demand (as well as seller's
costs) to increase."); Stevan D. Porter, Jr., EstimatingHypothetically NegotiatedRoyalty Rates
After Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., et al., J. LEGAL ECON., Mar. 2008, at 43, 46 ("At a
macro level, it is expected that potential licensees will be generally more willing to enter into
license agreements; firms will be less discriminating in the patents to which they take
licenses.").
106. Craswell, supra note 2, at 375-76 ("The marginal consumers themselves gain or lose
depending on whether they value the warranty more or less than the cost of the warranty to
sellers ....).
107. Joseph Farrell & Robert J. Merges, Incentives to ChallengeandDefendPatents: Why
Litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review
Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 946 (2004) ("However, an improper patent is
typically an unwarranted burden on consumers and on other innovation."). But see Dreyfuss &
Pope, supra note 9, at 974 (stating that challenge will often not lead to actual invalidation,
negating positive externalities while simultaneously decreasing the incentive to innovate).
108. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 82, at 2001 (injunction risk allows weak patents to
garner more royalties than their value implies). But see Elhauge, supra note 82.
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Even if the benefits could be calculated, they may be mitigated ifthe challenge right
does not generate sufficient challenges. If invalidation of bad patents is a public good,
then one would expect fewer challenges than are socially optimal, because the
challenger faces all of the cost and risk but only reaps some of the benefits. °9 Viewed
this way, then the subsidy to the licensee is insufficient to achieve sufficient patent
challenges even though it encourages more challenges than might exist without the
subsidy.
Thus, the tax may be justified if patent-challenge benefits are high enough, but it
becomes socially costly if it causes the supply of licensed patented innovations to
decrease more than the value of challenging bad patents. 10 Varying the challenge right
to consider both social costs and benefits' 11would be more optimal because the social
value of challenging strong patents is less than the value of challenging weak patents,
and the costs of challenging strong patents may also be higher. Further, considering the
costs and benefits of various licensees may provide more distributional justice to those
licensees who do not wish to challenge.12
However, determining the value of patent challenges and reshaping challenge policy
is outside the scope of this Article; the analysis presented takes judicial
pronouncements that licensees may challenge patents at any time as a given.
C. Who Pays the Tax?

Like any tax, the burden will be shared in part by the licensee in the form of higher
royalties;' 13 the licensee will not be the beneficiary of the entire value associated with

109. Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 9, at 1001 n.121 ("[Nonmutual collateral estoppel can]
discourage[] suit because it puts the challenger at a competitive disadvantage with respect to
everyone else in the field of the invention: that party must pay the full litigation cost of
invalidating the patent while its competitors enjoy the outcome for free. As a result, there is an
incentive to hold back, to wait and see whether someone else will do the hard work of putting
the invention into the public domain."); Farrell & Merges, supra note 107, at 952-53 (noting
the public good problem and noting that higher royalties are passed through to consumers,
further reducing incentives to challenge); Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 89, at 88; Joseph Scott
Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-StageRewardsfor DefeatingPatents, 19 BERKELEY
TEn. L.J. 667,687-88 (2004); John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent
System: A Proposalfor PatentBounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 305, 333-36.

110. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supranote 26, at 697 ("Once the role of contract law in encouraging
innovation is appreciated, several flaws in Lear's reasoning are exposed."). Dreyfuss also points
out that loss of control in licensing can cause inventors to avoid the patent system altogether,
creating a different type of social cost. Id. at 739-40.
111. For example, one might bar challenges for licenses that have been in effect for a longer
time period.
112. Craswell, supra note 2, at 376 ("If it is inappropriate to sacrifice the welfare of
consumers to benefit sellers, why is it more appropriate to sacrifice the welfare of some
consumers to benefit others [sic] consumers?").
113. The amount of the increase depends on basic economics-the shapes of the supply and
demand curves-with the patentee bearing the burden of any portion that is not passed on to the
licensee. Craswell, supranote 2, at 367 ("Because demand is somewhat elastic, however, the
increase in price... is less than the increase in seller's costs .... Thus, less than 100 percent of
the cost increase has been passed on."); Porter, supra note 105, at 46; see also supranote 101.
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its ability to challenge the patent.'" 4 Because weak patents lead to a higher likelihood
of challenge (higher s) and a higher chance of loss (higher I - w) one might expect
licenses for weaker patents to generate a higher tax than those for strong patents.
Therefore, perhaps counterintuitively,
licensees pay the highest premium for the right
5
to challenge the weakest patents."
This result is somewhat mitigated because the chance of winning and the royalty
effects may offset each other somewhat. Weak patents will likely garner lower royalties
from the outset. Likewise, as the patent grows stronger the chance of winning
increases, but so do the royalties, with each having an opposite effect on the tax. Thus,
a patentee with a low chance of losing large royalties may be subject to costs roughly
equivalent to a patentee with a higher chance of losing small royalties.
Thus, the fortuitous patentee that obtains high royalties on a weak patent would
have the most to lose, and thus would likely impose the highest tax. As a result,
nuisance demands that incorporate the tax would almost always seem excessive in
comparison to the value of the patent at issue. Despite the stigma attached to nuisance
settlements, licensees would certainly prefer that nuisance royalties be as low as
possible and would likely prefer not to spend additional money challenging
a patent
6
when the whole point of a nuisance payment is avoiding litigation."
Regardless of patent strength, because a challenge by one of many licensees puts all
of a patentee's current and future royalties at risk, the tax for any given license includes
more than just the benefit the challenging licensee might receive. Thus, the tax on each
license's royalty would increase as the patentee's total revenues increase; the greater
the patentee's revenues, the more the patentee would have to lose in a challenge. 117
Consequently, licensees would have to pay more for the right to challenge heavily

Schlicher argues that no licensing will occur for a certain subset of patents, but this assumes that
the licensee pays all of the costs associated with patent challenges. Schlicher, supra note 5, at
374. Depending on the supply and demand in a particular market, the licensee may wind up
paying much less of the tax than Schlicher assumes.
114. See Jennifer L. Collins & Michael A. Cicero, The Impact of MedImmune upon Both
Licensing andLitigation,89 J. PAT. &TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 748, 753-54 (2007) (patentees
should raise royalties to offset additional risk). The patentee will bear more of the costs if the
licensee can renegotiate the royalty without a lawsuit. See Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 9, at
974 ("At the time of a challenge, the risk that the patent will be invalidated could lead the patent
holder to settle on highly unfavorable terms .... The patent holder will, however, lose revenue,
leading to an impairment of patent value and a decrease in incentives to invent."). The patentee
will also bear more of the cost if it has no injunction leverage. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra
note 82, at 2001 (injunction risk causes royalty premium in weaker patents). However, the
challenge right will shift demand such that licensees may be willing to pay more of the tax.
Porter, supra note 105, at 46.
115. Miller, supra note 4, at 5.
116. Sudarshan, supra note 84, at 170 ("A low-cost settlement can be far more attractive
than a prolonged legal battle, despite the defendant's meritorious arguments of an invalid or
impermissibly broad patent.").
117. Cf Kim, supra note 100, at 635 (finding that firms with a larger market share also have
more licenses). But see O'Connor, supranote 9, at 446 (arguing that royalties are lowest during
the prechallenge period, because licensees will not challenge a patent until the time that it is sure
the technology will yield revenues). Ifthe question is expected value, however, then the license
fee would compensate for expected timing of the revenues.
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licensed patents because the royalty would incorporate the cost of losing all licenses,
not just one.
As a result of these two external pressures that increase the tax, the licensee's
increased royalty might exceed any potential benefit to it from the right to challenge
the patent.
III. STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING THE TAX
Insofar as any portion of the tax is passed on-and especially if that portion is
greater than the benefits of the challenge right-the licensee may want the same
contract language that decreases the probability of a patent challenge that patentees
would seek. Because no-challenge agreements are forbidden, parties might seek
proxies that signal the desire for "peace.""11 8 This Part discusses some of the possible
strategies for reducing the tax, and their effectiveness, practicality, and legality.
A. MeasuringEffectiveness
1. Effectiveness Is Measured from the Patentee's Viewpoint
Many of the proposed clauses increase the costs to the licensee in case of a
challenge, and thus signal that the licensee prefers peace" 9 rather than a challenge
(lowering s in the patentee's view). These clauses increase the potential costs from the
licensee's perspective, even if conditional on losing a challenge or even just initiating
one. However, the costs only increase for the licensee ifthe licensee intends to
challenge. For licensees that do not intend to challenge ex ante, such promises are
essentially costless gifts to the patentee in exchange for a lower royalty.
If, however, the licensee intends to challenge or even ifthe licensee wants to retain
the possibility of challenge, then the licensee will view these provisions as potential
costs and the licensee may not agree to one or more of these provisions in addition to
the royalties the patentee seeks-royalties that are inflated because the patentee
perceives a challenge risk due to the licensee's refusal to accept such provisions.
Thus, the focus is on the patentee's perception. Because the patentee does not know
with certainty whether the licensee will challenge, the patentee will consider the effect
of all signals, including a licensee's unwillingness to accept terms that should be
costless if the licensee does not plan a challenge. All other things equal, the license fee
should be the lowest where the contract includes the highest challenge costs to the
licensee and the lowest potential losses to the patentee upon a challenge.
2. The Tax Is Never Zero
There is an important caveat, however: none of these provisions, not even the nochallenge provision, can completely eliminate the premium associated with the
patentee's inability to collect royalties on an invalid license. This is because a third

118. Miller, supranote 4, at 4.

119. Such clauses might also imply a licensee's lack of bargaining power rather than
preferences, but the result is the same--the patentee will perceive less chance of challenge.
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party-whether a prior licensee not subject to such clauses or a potential infringer that
seeks declaratory relief-can always invalidate the patent. 2 0 Once the patent is
invalidated by anyone, all licenses become voidable, and the patentee loses the
respective royalty streams.
However, this possibility existed before the MedImmune case-instead, the
establishment of nonmutual collateral estoppel in 1971 created this risk for
patentees.' 21 Thus, the discussed contract provisions only affect the prospective
challenge risk associated with licensee's challenge and not collateral attacks from
nonlicensees or other parties that are not subject to any challenge restrictions.
Further, as discussed in more detail below, uncertainty about the legality of any
provision will likely prevent complete elimination of the tax. Uncertainty can be
mitigated if any combination of contractual strategies is coupled with a severability
clause.122 Severance allows each clause to operate independently and redundantly, in
case a court rules that any other provisions are void as a matter of law.
B. LitigationStrategies
1. Filing a Complaint
Some have suggested that the best way to ensure a final agreement is to sue the
potential licensee and settle the case, because patent licenses resulting from litigation
are unchallengeable res judicata. 123 This theory is facially appealing. It should lower
the chance of challenge (s) to zero. It may also make the patent appear stronger, thus
increasing the possibility of higher royalties on future licenses (e124 Both would
lower and potentially eliminate the tax.
However, litigation is not without problems. First, if the licensee does not agree to
have a suit filed, it may decide to proceed with litigation and challenge the patent. 125
This will be especially true if the patentee sues without even notifying the licensee of
the possibility of agreement, which it might do in order to obtain a litigation advantage

120. Porter, supra note 105, at 47.
121. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971) (applying
nonmutual collateral estoppel against the patentee).
122. Bleeker & O'Shaughnessy, supra note 9; Kuwahara & Lavey, supra note 9, at 160-61,
at 435. Sample language appears infra App. II.5.A.
123. E.g., Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Am. Equip. Corp.
v. Wikomi Mfg. Co., 630 F.2d 544,547-48 (7th Cir. 1980); Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531
F.2d 1368, 1374 (6th Cir. 1976); Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. USM Corp., 525 F.2d 775, 780-81 (6th
Cir. 1975); Broadview Chem. Corp. v. Loctite Corp., 474 F.2d 1391, 1394-95 (2d Cir. 1973);
Best, supra note 49, at 27; Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 9, at 982. Bleeker and O'Shaughnessy
suggest that patentees file a complaint without serving to preserve plaintiff status and venue.
Bleeker & O'Shaughnessy, supranote 9, at 431-32. This would likely have little effect on the
tax because one must serve within a relatively short period of time-well before most disputes
would arise. See id.
124. There should be no effect on the chance of winning future challenges (w) because
nonmutual collateral estoppel would limit the results of any litigation with respect to other

potential licensees.
125. The patentee could choose to continue as well. See Dreyfuss & Pope, supranote 9, at
979-80.
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or to avoid false signals, as discussed below. 126 This means that the likelihood of
challenge (s) is not zero and may actually be higher than it would have been if the
parties had agreed without the unexpected litigation.
Second, if the licensee does agree to litigation with the intention of entering into a
settlement, then the dispute may not be justiciable under Article III's case or
controversy requirement.127 This leads to two problems. One problem is that a
settlement by consent judgment would not be enforceable, as subject-matter challenges
are never waived 12S-making the judgment voidable at any time. The second problem
is that a settlement by agreement might not be given sufficient res judicata effect to bar
a subsequent patent challenge-especially where the parties agreed to file suit and did
not obtain court rulings on any issue. 29 However, to the extent that agreeing to litigate
sends a signal that there will be no challenge, (s) may be lowered even without res
judicata.
Third, the signals may be strategically false to gain a litigation advantage. A party
may suggest bringing a declaratory-relief action to challenge validity to maximize the
res judicata effect; this transforms a potential defendant into a plaintiff. Similarly,
either party might agree to a lawsuit to gain a venue advantage. Even if both parties
eventually behave honorably, the potential for gaming increases the patentee's
perceived likelihood of challenge (s).
Even if an agreed litigation might be given res judicata force, any possibility of
challenge will lead to some tax, in addition to whatever litigation costs might be
incurred. The effect of any uncertainty in (s) on the tax may be low, depending on

126. For example, see Complaint at 15, Priest v. Google, Inc., No. 1:08-CV12056-DPW (D.
Mass. filed Dec. 11 2008) available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/districtcourts/massachusetts/madce/1:2008cv12056/119292/1/ ("[T]he plaintiffs prefer reaching this
fair settlement through friendly appreciation and negotiation. In any event, we encourage
defendant to not view this complaint as 'litigious behavior' and to view it in respective good
faith and action."). See also Eric Goldman, Patent Lawsuit Filed Over Google Reader-Priest v.
Google, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/ archives/2008/12/patent lawsuit.htm (Dec. 11, 2008,
14:45 EST).

127. Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 9, at 998 ("Moreover, while MedImmune took a liberal
attitude toward the availability of declaratory judgment actions in patent cases, it did not abolish
all standing and ripeness requirements.").
128. U.S. Catholic Conf. v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, 487 U.S. 72, 77 (1988) (stating
that orders of court issued without subj ect-matter jurisdiction may be challenged, even by third
parties).
129. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 567 F.2d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 1977)
(settlement shortly after litigation does not bar challenge); Kraly v. Nat'l Distillers & Chem.
Corp., 502 F.2d 1366, 1369 (7th Cir. 1974); Bus. Forms Finishing Serv., Inc. v. Carson, 452
F.2d 70, 73 (7th Cir. 1971); Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. Cooper, 156 F.2d 483, 484-85
(2d Cir. 1946) (stating that court must consider issues actually decided); Dreyfuss & Pope,
supranote 9, at 998 ("[Tlhe ability to actually use discovery and proceed before the court is
what distinguishes the proceedings from sham litigation and gives legitimacy to the consent
decree."); see also Freeman v. Altvater, 129 F.2d 494, 499 (8th Cir. 1942) (stating that there
was no res judicata on invalidity issue from prior lawsuit), rev'd in part, 319 U.S. 359, 360-61
(1943) (allowing invalidity challenge to go forward where prior invalidity challenge was not
determined on the merits). But see Hemstreet v. Spiegel, Inc., 851 F.2d 348, 349-50 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (settlement shortly after litigation still bars challenge).
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whether the royalty is set before or after the lawsuit is filed. If the royalty is set before,
then it will take the increased (s) into account, and the tax will be higher. If the royalty
is set after filing, then it should have little or no effect-the parties will know with
certainty whether the litigation is a real challenge at the time of the settlement decision.
Even if the royalty is not affected, an increased (s) will have another effect. As
discussed in Appendix I, Equation 18, when the chance of a patent challenge increases,
patentees will be more likely to litigate rather than settle. Thus, to the extent that filing
a lawsuit increases the chance that the result will be continued litigation rather than
settlement, patentees may also favor proceeding with litigation. Even if settlement is
still a possibility, the decision to commit to litigation may change the relationship
between the parties, as well as the probabilities and costs, all of which will impact the
final royalty paid by the potential licensee.
2. Settlement Agreements
A less risky alternative is to emphasize that the license agreement is actually a
settlement of threatened litigation.13 However, on its own, such language would not
lower the tax much, as Lear and its progeny make clear: a settlement without litigation
is insufficient to invoke licensee estoppel.131 While MedImmune contains dicta
implying that the Court was not deciding whether a settlement agreement might bar a
challenge by a nonrepudiating licensee, 132 such a ruling would require the Court's
overruling of unanimous circuit law, which is unlikely to happen anytime soon.
Further, Medlmmune is clear that litigation will proceed in all events, 33 meaning that
the patentee will always be at risk for some litigation costs.
Thus, settlement language would have to be coupled with litigation.' 34 As a result,
"settlement agreements" are unlikely to reduce the challenge tax much.
In sum, litigation strategies are legal, but not terribly practical or effective.
C. Up-FrontPayment Strategies
A licensee might signal that it will not challenge a patent by making up-front
payments. 135 Two types of up-front payments are the prepaid license fee and the
ownership interest.
A prepaid fee requires the licensee to pay the entire license fee at the time of
contract execution. This payment has two signaling effects. First, it reduces future
royalties (r) to zero, reducing the tax because the patentee has nothing to lose. 136 This

130. Schlicher, supra note 5, at 391. Sample contract language appears infra App. II.1.A.
131. Massillon-Cleveland Akron Sign Co. v. Golden State Adver. Co., 444 F.2d 425,427
(9th Cir. 1971).
132. MedImmune v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 134-35 (2007) (leaving open the
question about whether a settlement agreement might be enforceable).
133. Id.
134. See infra Part III.B. 1.
135. See Collins & Cicero, supra note 114, at 754; Schlicher, supra note 5, at 390-91
(suggesting shift of royalties to "pre-challenge" period).
136. Kuwahara & Lavey, supranote 9, at 159 ("[A] higher nonrefundable upfront license fee
may discourage a licensee from challenging the licensed patents because it limits the benefits to
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reduction alone would not eliminate the tax, as a patent challenge might negate future
royalties from other potential and actual licensees. However, because the licensee
would have little or nothing at stake the likelihood of a challenge (s) would also be
reduced, further lowering the tax.
Problems with the prepaid fee are practical and legal. Practically, licensees may not
want--or may not be able to afford-a prepayment of the entire license fee because
they have yet to develop a product.' 3 7 Additionally, patentees may not want to
surrender the possibility of large revenues if the licensed product is extremely
successful. 38 Also, it may be impossible to estimate the net present value of royalty
payments with sufficient detail to calculate a payment, 39 and even if such an estimate
can be made, the patentee would have to discount that fee even further
to offset the
0
licensee's risk that the patent will not yield a marketable product.14
Thus, a fully prepaid license may be available only in limited circumstances. A
more common option would be a partially prepaid, partially royalty-bearing license.
This type of license provides some of the signaling benefits of a fully prepaid license;
but, a royalty stream means that the more successful a product is, the more likely there
will be a challenge and the more the patentee has to lose. Thus, there will likely be
some tax component, with the size dependent on the licensed product's expected
success.
Legally, a fully paid patent license may not be sufficient to bar future challenges. To
the extent that federal policy favors challenges, such a policy might require a refund of
the "unused" portion of any fully paid fee.14 1Furthermore, payment through financing
or a negotiable instrument may be considered a royalty stream and thus barred once a
patent is found invalid.' 42 Of course, prepayment could easily have the opposite

the licensee from such a challenge.").
137. Dreyfuss &Pope, supranote 9, at 992-93 (discussing problems with upfront payments,
but also suggesting that a negotiable instrument could be used rather than cash); O'Connor,
supranote 9, at 446, 451-52.
138. Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 9, at 992 ("Depending on the size of the lump sum
payment, the patent holder will still run considerable risk that compensation for the invention
will fall short of the benefit it confers on the licensee.").
139. O'Connor, supra note 9, at 452. Note that this is a transaction cost barrier to the
negotiation of such fees. Despite this cost, the underlying assumption that patentees can guess
the range of potential future royalties sufficiently to estimate the challenge tax likely still holds.
Internal estimates for future returns, even if hopeful, are sufficient for planning even if they are
not sufficient for price negotiation.
140. Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 9, at 994 ("The discount would likely be considerable: not
only would the licensee have paid for an unnecessary license under an invalid patent but it
would be at an economic disadvantage compared to its competitors in the licensed field who had
not paid such a lump sum and therefore do not need to recover it in their sales price.").
141. See Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 9 at 994 ("[A) paid-up license could be viewed as
frustrating the 'private attorney general' policy underlying Lear. After all, once the licensee has
paid for the right to practice the invention, it is less likely to challenge the patent."). But see
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 138-39 (1969) ("The Court also
said in Automatic Radio [Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine, 339 U.S. 827 (1950)] that if the licensee ...

agrees to a lump sum or a percentage-of-total-sales royalty, he cannot escape payment on this
basis by demonstrating that he is no longer using the invention disclosed by the patent. We [do
not] disagree.").
142. Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 9, at 995 ("Nonetheless, the approaches that use
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effect-potential licensees faced with a lump-sum fee are more43likely to challenge a
patent earlier than those who can both pay and challenge later.
Another approach is the use of corporate stock and stock options to emulate a
royalty stream." 4 Under this method, equity would be fully paid at license execution,
such that it would not be refundable upon a successful challenge.145 However, the
stock's value would be contingent on the success of the company licensing the patentthe more sales, the more stock value, which is similar to a royalty stream for the same
sales. 146 This plan would have an effect on the tax similar to a fully paid license. The
future royalties at risk (r) would be zero, and stock payments would theoretically
reduce the risk of challenge (s) as well.
There are a few practical problems with this proposal. First, the proposal would
likely be possible only for newly started, single-technology companies. 47 Second,even
in this special case, it is not clear that stock value would accurately reflect product
success.148 Third, the plan would likely work best with exclusive licenses only, because
nonexclusive licenses mean more competition in the marketplace. As a result, the stock
proxy might be effective but only for a small fraction of patent licenses.
A suggested solution to some of these problems is to set a stock option vesting
schedule based on product sales, ideally in a separate agreement. 49 While this solution
would better tie value to the licensed product, vested stock looks more like a royalty
paid in stock options rather than cash. Courts may view such a transaction as form over
substance, and bar all future vesting upon a successful patent challenge, just as they
would bar future royalties. Even if such vesting were not voided, such transactions
would still be limited, and it would still be difficult to tie future vested stock value to
product sales.
To the extent that courts would not require a refund, prepaid licenses are likely to be
highly effective and legal, but they are not terribly practical.
D. No-Contest Strategies
1. No-Contest Clause
Licensees might agree not to sue or otherwise challenge a patent. 5 ° As discussed in
Part I, such an agreement would be void in most cases.' 5' However, if courts were to

negotiable instruments or installments may appear particularly vulnerable to a Brulotte
challenge because inthose cases, it is evident that payments will continue even if the patent is
invalidated by a third party."). But see Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp. v. Spiller & Spiller, Inc.,
489 F.2d 974, 977 (7th Cir. 1973) (stating that installment payments are enforceable after
invalidation of patent).
143. Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 9, at 994.
144. O'Connor, supranote 9, at 453-54, 459-60.
145. Id. at 453-54.
146. Id. at 462.
147. These are the companies that O'Connor is most concerned with, as they are the least
likely to be able to fully pay a license. See O'Connor, supra note 9, at 451-52.
148. Id. at 462. This includes stock illiquidity. See id. at 461.
149. Id. at 464.
150. Collins & Cicero, supra note 114, at 752; Kuwahara & Lavey, supra note 9, at 157.
Dreyfuss argues that such a clause should be enforceable. Dreyfuss, supra note 26, at 723-24.
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start allowing such clauses, this would be the cheapest and easiest way to eliminate the
patent-challenge tax. It would lower the likelihood of a challenge (s) to nearly zero. Of
course, parties can always sue, even if they lose, so the likelihood would not be zero,
though if such clauses were enforced on a motion to dismiss, then litigation costs (c)
would be low and the challenge tax would likely be as small as it will ever be.
However, any uncertainty about effective enforcement of a no-challenge provision
will likely not have much effect on the tax depending on the stakes.' 52 Because the
chance of challenge (s) is based on the patentee's perception, patentees--especially
risk-averse patentees-may give little weight to the possibility that the clause will be
enforceable. They will also not want to wait until the end of an expensive litigation
(large c) to vindicate the no-challenge right. Where there is uncertainty about
enforceability, the licensee may offer up large liquidated damages and payment of
attorneys' fees if a covenant not to sue is breached,153 but the effects of such clauses
are limited because the patentee still has the risk of losing future royalties.
This is not to say that an unenforceable no-contest clause would not lower the tax
some. To the extent the patentee believes the licensee will be bound by the moral
obligation imposed by the clause, or that the licensee does not believe that the clause is
void (a distinct possibility given the discussion in Part I.B), the patentee will perceive a
lower possibility of challenge (s) and a commensurately lower tax.
2. Terminate-on-Challenge Clauses
54

An alternative to the no-contest provision is a terminate-on-challenge provision.
This provision would be effectuated by treating the finality of the license as a
condition, such that any lawsuit by the licensee terminates the contract. 55 This
provision differs from a no-contest provision because it allows the licensee to freely
challenge the patent at any time.
The terminate-on-challenge clause affects the tax in two ways. First, it lowers the
likelihood of challenge because a challenge becomes more costly to the licensee-it
can no longer challenge and use the licensed patent at the same time. As the value of
the licensed product increases, the licensee's cost of termination increases.

Dreyfuss and Pope argue that Medlmmune makes such clauses legal. Dreyfuss & Pope, supra
note 9, at 1005-06. Lewis R. Clayton makes the creative argument that such provisions should
be enforceable for all patents whose validity has been upheld, even in litigation with others.
Lewis R. Clayton, 'MedImmune' Ruling, NAT'L L.J. 13, Feb. 19, 2007. Sample language
appears infra App. I1.1.B.
151. See supra Part I.
152. See Dreyfuss, supra note 26, at 745-46 (stating that uncertainty about patent validity
may reduce expected profit, decreasing incentive to innovate).
153. For sample language see infra App. I1.I.C.
154. Bleeker & O'Shaughnessy, supranote 9, at 433; Collins & Cicero, supranote 114, at
752-53; Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 9, at 1003-05; Kuwahara &Lavey, supranote 9, at 159;
Schlicher, supranote 5, at 388-89. Schlicher also suggests the alternatives of termination as of
the effective date of the license-essentially rescission-as well as termination only upon a
failed challenge. Schlicher, supra note 5, at 388-89. Dreyfuss and Pope suggest that the clause
be as broad as possible, providing the option to terminate if the licensee provides aid to a thirdparty challenge, challenges a foreign patent, or initiates any official proceeding, such as a
reexamination. Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 9, at 1004.
155. For sample language see infra App. II.2.A.
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Second, a termination-on-challenge provision allows the patentee to obtain damages
that are larger than the royalty if the patentee countersues for infringement and then
wins in litigation. Enhanced damages eliminate some of the asymmetric costs
associated with agreeing to a license and reduces the patent tax by the chance of
winning damages if there is a challenge (swe).156 Potential treble damages, attorneys'
fee recoveries, and injunctions are likely to make expected damages large. Thus, the
ability of this provision to reduce the tax will depend on whether the value of the
licensee's product is large enough to offset these potential damages, something that is
difficult to know at the time of license execution, but that each party hopes will be true
for its own reasons.
However, this provision's ability to lower the tax might be mitigated for a few
reasons. First, such a provision's enforceability is unsettled. 157 Termination clauses, if
used at all, were rarely tested because prior to MedImmune, licensees were required 1to
59
58
repudiate the license to challenge. Some courts have upheld such provisions,
while another appears to favor termination, 160 but these cases were decided before
MedImmune, when the effects of termination were no different than the required
repudiation. It also appears that international law would allow such clauses, 161 perhaps
making them more acceptable in the United States.
The argument against termination provisions is that they increase licensee challenge
162
costs, an effect directly contrary to the policy of Lear and several follow-on cases.

156. As discussed in Appendix I, e represents the amount of damages a patentee might win
in excess of what a negotiated royalty might be, so swe represents the expected damages
associated with a challenge-if there is one, and if the patentee wins.
157. Kuwahara & Lavey, supra note 9, at 159.
158. Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 9, at 1004-05 ("The MedImmune and LearCourts did not
consider the issue because until MedImmune was decided in 2007, no such clause was
considered necessary.").
159. Neb. Engineering Corp. v. Shivvers, 557 F.2d 1257, 1260 (8th Cir. 1977) (denying
injunction barring exercise of termination clause); Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms., Inc., 228 F.
Supp. 2d 467, 773-74 (D. Del. 2002) (voiding a royalty payment provision, but not voiding a
termination provision); cf.Hull v. Brunswick Corp., 704 F.2d 1195, 1200 n.6 (10th Cir. 1983)
("The existence of a termination clause does not itself eliminate the illegal nature of an
oppressive license agreement. But when the agreement is legal and enforceable, its termination
provisions provide a viable method for a dissatisfied party to end the relationship." (citation
omitted)).
160. Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 780 F.2d 991, 995 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("[W]e find no
authority in Learfor... preliminarily enjoining a licensor from cancelling the license agreement
and, thus, from counterclaiming for patent infringement when this material breach of the license
occurs.").
161. See Bleeker & O'Shaughnessy, supra note 9, at 433 (citing Commission Regulation
772/04, 2004 O.J. (L 123) 11 (EU)); Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 9, at 1003 ("Indeed, in
Europe, where there are no standing requirements for bringing actions to nullify a patent,
termination-on-challenge clauses are routinely used to protect licensors from legal actions on the
part of licensees."); Kuwahara & Lavey, supra note 9, at 159 (noting that such clauses are
acceptable under Japanese law and under free trade agreements).
162. See Timely Prods., Inc. v. Constanzo, 465 F. Supp. 91, 96 (D. Conn. 1979) (stating that
a fifty percent reduction on successful challenge eliminates incentive to challenge and is void);
Crane Co. v. Aeroquip Corp., 356 F. Supp. 733, 738-39 (N.D. Ill. 1973) ("[J]ust as the
imposition of the doctrine of licensee estoppel would have a chilling effect on meritorious
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These cases seem to hold that any provision that makes it more costly to challenge a
patent is void. At the same time, cases that extend1Lear
beyond a no-challenge bar may
63
not have the reach that they did thirty years ago.
For example, the Federal Circuit might not object to a termination provision
because its law; if one believes that Shell Oil is a substantive bar, holds that one must
repudiate a license to challenge a patent even after Medlmmune.' 64 If so, then there
should be no objection to the termination of the license agreement upon challenge.
As noted above, though, any uncertainty in the law is unlikely to lead to a large
reduction in the patent tax, so the arguments on each side of this issue may be enough
to eliminate much of this signal's value, at least until legality is tested and established.
On the other hand, a licensee's agreement to license termination might be a
sufficient signal to persuade the patentee that there is unlikely to be a challenge, and
certainly not one in the short run. Further, the licensee's incentives to challenge in the
long run would be decreased because losing a license associated with a valuable
product would potentially lead to higher litigation damages or even an injunction. This
effect might still be limited, however, because the injunction risk might lead to
inflation of the royalty due to holdup pressure. 165 Thus, some might argue that the tax
is likely minimized most where the terminate-on-challenge clause also bars injunctive
166
relief.
A second mitigating factor applies to exclusive licenses. Termination of exclusive
licenses may lead to a loss of royalty stream that is larger than the reduction in tax. In
the extreme, the loss of working capital during the litigation can put the
patentee/licensor out of business. Even if the license becomes nonexclusive upon
challenge, ongoing litigation will diminish
the value of future licenses if one can be
167
secured at all during or after a challenge.
However, concern about exclusive licenses may be overstated. First, if the business
risk is greatest for exclusive licenses, then the commensurate royalty will also be
highest, but not because of the challenge tax. Instead, the exclusive royalty will
incorporate the business risk associated with losing the license, and it would still be
worthwhile for a licensee to reduce the tax through one of the strategies discussed
here. 168 Second, patentees can always avoid the risk by licensing to multiple parties,
challenges to patents.., so would the threat of termination of the license have a similar effect.
If raising the defense of validity were sufficient grounds for terminating a license, then licensees
might hesitate to challenge a patent because of the potential sanction in doing so."), modifiedon
other grounds, 504 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding termination clause invalid); Best, supra
note 49, at 27; Dreyfuss, supra note 26, at 700.
163. See Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 9 at 1005.
164. Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128 (2007). For a discussion of this
view of Shell Oil and its viability, see supra Part I.B.
165. But see Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 82, at 2001-02 (stating that injunction risk
causes patent premium).
166. Of course, if there is a license and a low-challenge risk, then the holdup pressure will be
less.
167. O'Connor, supra note 9, at 446-48. O'Connor argues that this cost is greatest for
universities and research centers-entities that provide social benefits through research and
exclusive licensing. However, the university experience is not much different than nonexclusive
licensing, where patent invalidity can jeopardize every license, not just the one being litigated.
Id. at 448 n.236.
168. For a formal proof for the proposition that the tax for a single exclusive license is no
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foregoing the exclusive license. Third, any terminate-on-challenge provision can
include a clause that gives the patentee the option to terminate. 169 This option might
disincentivize a challenge while retaining the patentee's potential value. 170 Fourth, if
the licensee is allowed to escrow payments upon challenge, then the termination right
adds no marginal harm to the patentee. If the royalty stream will dry up in any event,
even if only during litigation, then it would be better to reduce the likelihood of
challenge and to allow for infringement damages if possible.
3. Patentee's Covenant Not To Sue
The patentee might agree not to sue the licensee for patent infringement, even upon
a challenge or breach of the license. 171 This covenant not to sue might reduce the
chance of challenge (s) by eliminating
any controversy between the parties, thus
72
divesting the courts ofjurisdiction
One potential concern is that this covenant would limit the patentee's potential
damages associated with terminate-on-challenge clauses, decreasing their effectiveness
in reducing the tax. This concern is easily mitigated by tying each party's covenant not
to sue to a single condition, such that a terminate-on-challenge provision also
terminates the patentee's covenant not to sue. 173 This would leave the patentee free to
seek damages if the patent is challenged.
A bigger problem with these provisions is that they likely would not achieve their
goal of eliminating justiciable controversies. The covenant not to sue is similar to the
settlement agreements discussed above 174-they do not make no-contest provisions

different than the tax for a single nonexclusive license for any given royalty rate, and that the tax
is even greater if there are multiple licenses, see infra App. 1, equation 32.
169. Dreyfuss & Pope, supranote 9, at 1002 ("[A termination provision] should not provide
for automatic termination, but, rather, for an option to terminate."). For sample contract
language see infra App. I, equation 32.
170. Cf. Schlicher, supra note 5, at 389 (stating that an option to terminate is more valuable
to patentee than requiring licensee to terminate prior to challenge.).
171. Benitec Austl., Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc., 495 F.3d 1340, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(holding that a covenant not to sue eliminates controversy); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis
Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase
Packaging Corp, 57 F.3d 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Bleeker & O'Shaughnessy, supra note 9, at
423. For sample language, see infra App. II.1.B. An effective detente might be achieved
noncontractually (and with current licenses) by simply not answering any demands for
clarification by the licensee. Schlicher, supranote 5, at 384-85. However, failure to respond
may be a sufficient indication of nonagreement to warrant a controversy. See SanDisk Corp. v.
STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding declaratory relief
jurisdiction despite no specific threat of suit); Bleeker & O'Shaughnessy, supra note 9, at 411,
423 n.183; cf. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 134 n.12 (holding that
declaratory reliefjurisdiction still exists even ifthe patentee has not overtly threatened litigation
prior to licensing). But see Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1341 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (holding that a patentee's refusal to sign covenant not to sue does not alone create
controversy).
172. O'Connor, supranote 9, at 432-33. MedImmune leaves this question open. 549 U.S. at
134-35.
173. For sample language, see infra App. II.2.A.
174. See infra Part III.B.2.
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suddenly enforceable. Because a licensee can always seek patent invalidity as a way to
avoid royalties, a controversy is present so long as the patentee asks for payment in
accordance with the license.' 75 That the patentee has promised not to sue for
infringement does not make the license any less coercive in its attempt to extract
money from the licensee; the patentee would still sue for breach of contract. This is
especially true if the covenant ends upon a challenge, because the licensee would then
be at risk of being sued for infringement. 176 As such, the licensee can always claim that
there is a justiciable dispute between the parties.
Of the no-challenge strategies, a terminate-on-challenge clause at the patentee's
option is the most likely to be legal, practical, and effective.
E. Royalty Escalation,Cost, and Damages Strategies
The challenge tax might be reduced by implementing clauses that either make it
more expensive for the licensee to challenge or compensate the patentee for the
challenge.
1. Royalty Continuation
Although the general rule is that royalties must be paid until the time of a
challenge, 177 the parties might make this more certain by agreeing that any challenge
will only affect future royalties. 78 The effect on the tax would depend on the patentee's
trust in the general rule.
A more aggressive approach would be for the parties to agree that royalties shall
only cease upon an actual final ruling of invalidity, and that any royalties prior to that
time are nonrefundable.1 79 This approach would decrease the future royalties (r) at
stake, reducing the tax. To the extent that such a rule might give the patentee an
incentive to take all appeals, higher litigation costs (c) might create a countervailing
increase in the tax. This offset would likely be small, however, because without this
clause, potential lost royalties (r) would be higher and other contract revenues (r)
would also be at stake, providing the same incentive to fully litigate.

175. Cf Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1295 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (any injury sufficient to create a controversy).
176. Revolution Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, Inc., No. 2009-1443,2009 WL 2921314
(Fed. Cir. Sept. 11, 2009) (holding that a covenant that does not apply to future products does
not divest jurisdiction); Honeywell Int'l Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 488 F.3d 982,
995-96 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (stating that withdrawal of some claims but not others leads to
controversy for entire patent); Sierra Applied Sci., Inc. v. Advanced Energy Indus., 363 F.3d
1361, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2004); FieldTurf USA, Inc. v. Sports Constr. Group, LLC, 507 F. Supp.
2d 801, 808 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (holding that a conditional covenant does not eliminate
controversy); Bleeker & O'Shaughnessy, supra note 9, at 424; O'Connor, supranote 9, at 433.
But see Furminator, Inc. v. Ontel Prods. Corp., 246 F.R.D. 579, 589 (E.D. Mo. 2007) (holding
that covenant not to sue on current but not future products still divests court of jurisdiction),
aff'd without opinion, 214 F. App'x 982 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
177. See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 674 (1969).
178. Collins & Cicero, supranote 114, at 755. For sample language, see supra App. II.5.B.
179. Collins & Cicero, supra note 114, at 755; Kuwahara & Lavey, supranote 9, at 159-60.
For sample language, see infraApp. II.5.C.
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The continuing royalty provision might be difficult to enforce. Courts have found 80a
requirement to pay nonrefundable royalties until an invalidity finding unenforceable. 1
However, such decisions were based on repudiation. Where a licensee desires the
protection of a license during a challenge, courts have been more willing to require
payment of royalties during litigation.' Even so,
82 the patentee would likely be required
to refund royalties on a successful challenge.'
A slightly less aggressive approach would be a no-escrow clause. 83 The licensee
would agree that in the case of a challenge it would not seek to escrow fees during the
litigation's pendency. A no-escrow provision would be especially important for
patentees that rely on the royalty stream to do business, such as in exclusive licenses or
for patentees with little capitalization.'8 4 Where the parties are well capitalized,
however, this provision would have little effect, as the royalties would have to be
returned by the patentee upon a loss. This clause
is likely enforceable, as escrows have
85
already been frowned on by many courts.'
Finally, the parties might agree to one last hope-that the courts will reverse
themselves. Thus, the license would state that, if in the future royalties can be collected
on invalid or noninfringed patents, then royalties will recommence.'8 6 This would
decrease the tax in two ways. First, it would increase the possibility for future royalties
to the patentee even in the event of a loss. Second, it would increase the cost of a
challenge, thus reducing the likelihood of one. This provision might very well be valid,
but its utility is limited by patent terms;
any given patent might well expire before such
187
an unlikely ruling were ever made.

180. Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 780 F.2d 991, 995 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("The holding of
Lear... prevents the affirmative enforcement by the licensor of the royalty payment provisions
of the license agreement while the patent's validity is being challenged by the licensee."); Bayer
AG v. Housey Pharms., Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 467, 474 (D. Del. 2002) (voiding a clause that
explicitly requires royalty payment during a challenge); see also Timely Prods., Inc. v.
Constanzo, 465 F. Supp. 91, 96 (D. Conn. 1979) (holding that royalty reduction of only fifty
percent on patent invalidity is unenforceable).
181. Medtronic, 780 F.2d at 995 ("[W]e find no authority in Lear for establishing an escrow
account for royalties duependente lite...."); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp. 567
F.2d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 1977) (denying licensee request to escrow, but noting that royalties may
have to be refunded if licensee wins challenge).
182. Warner-Jenkinson,567 F.2d at 188. But see Collins & Cicero, supra note 114, at 755
(arguing that Medlmmune implies that no-refund provision might still be enforceable).
183. For sample language, see infraApp. II.5.D.
184. Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 9, at 975 ("[T]he participants are likely to be in poor
positions to deal with either risk or cash-flow problems: the patent holders in emerging sectors
are likely to be small companies that are highly dependent on their patent revenues, or
universities, which rely on licensing income to fund their technology transfer operations.").
185. See supra note 181.
186. For sample language, see infra App. II.5.E.
187. Given that recent moves favor patent challenges, it is unlikely that such a ruling will
ever happen.
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2. Royalty Escalation
A licensee might signal that it will not challenge a patent by agreeing to pay more
royalties in case of a patent challenge.' 88 Such an escalation clause might come in two
89
forms: (1) escalation upon filing of suit, and (2) escalation upon losing a suit.
Obviously, the earlier the escalation, the higher the potential fees paid by the licensee
in case of challenge.
Escalation reduces the tax in two ways. First, by increasing the licensee's cost, the
likelihood of challenge (s) is decreased.'9° Second, the patentee stands to gain more if
it wins the challenge, similar to the termination right. This gain reduces the tax by the
probability of winning the challenge if there is one multiplied by the escalation (swe).
Of course, to the extent that patentees can gain more from a challenge, they might
spend more defending the patent. This spending would increase litigation costs (c),
offsetting some benefit of the escalation.
Royalties that escalate if the challenger loses should be enforceable because the
licensee avoids the escalated royalties if it wins the challenge, thus leaving the
incentive to challenge. 191 Another argument in favor of escalation is that a patentee

188. Bleeker & O'Shaughnessy, supra note 9, at 433; Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 9, at
1001 ("One approach is to... provide for an increase in the royalty rate should the challenge be
unsuccessful."); Kuwahara & Lavey, supra note 9, at 159; Schlicher, supra note 5, at 390.
Schlicher also suggests that the patentee charge even more and then rebate royalties if there is
no challenge. Schlicher, supra note 5, at 389-90. This is similar to a "reverse escalation" but
may be less palatable to licensees because of up-front costs and risk of patentee insolvency.
Then again, it may be more palatable from a legal standpoint, as there is no explicit penalty for
challenge. Bleeker and O'Shaughnessy suggest a royalty declination upon a successful challenge
but, as they note, such a provision is likely unenforceable so long as the law does not allow any
enforcement of an invalid patent. Bleeker & O'Shaughnessy, supranote 9, at 433-35.
189. Collins & Cicero, supra note 114, at 754; Dreyfuss &Pope, supra note 9, at 1001 ("A
second idea is to establish a three-tier system, with the rate increasing once a challenge is
mounted, and providing for an even higher royalty if the challenge is not successful.");
Kuwahara & Lavey, supra note 9, at 159; O'Connor, supra note 9, at 446 ("In the extreme, one
might imagine a licensor structuring a license to require only a 'discounted' royalty rate for
unchallenged patents, but then increasing that rate after successfully defending the validity of
her patent .... "); Schlicher, supra note 5, at 390. For sample language, see infra App. II.2.B.
190. Cf Farrell &Merges, supranote 107, at 954-55 ("Patentees can also charge differential
royalties in a way that penalizes holdout firms who do not settle early. This hardball behavior by
the patentee strengthens the infringer's incentive to win if it brings a challenge, but further
weakens the infringer's incentive to challenge in the first place rather than quietly pay up.").
191. Bleeker & O'Shaughnessy, supra note 9, at 434 ("Presumably, if the licenseefails to
prove invalidity (or non-infringement), then the licensee has breached the license agreement
without good cause and might arguably be subject to penalties specified in the agreement."
(emphasis in original)); Dreyfuss &Pope, supra note 9, at 1002 ("Furthermore, the different rate
does not entirely eliminate the incentive to challenge: if the challenge is successful, the licensee
will terminate the license and escape the obligation to pay royalties."); Kuwahara & Lavey,
supra note 9, at 159 ("The Supreme Court is likely to allow some increase in royalty rate under
these conditions unless such an increase is unjustly large that could effectively eliminate the
licensee's right to challenge the validity of licensed patent without loss of the benefit of the
license."). But see Schlicher, supra note 5, at 390 n.48 (arguing that escalation clauses are no
different than no-challenge clauses, and thus likely to be found unenforceable).

2010]

PATENT CHALLENGES AND ROYALTY INFLATION

1037

may charge whatever it likes, so long as the patent is valid.'92 Furthermore, because no
escalation is an
injunction is available against a nonrepudiating licensee, a royalty
93
agreed upon reasonable royalty imposed on the losing licensee.
The reasonable-royalty argument is doubly important because any escalation clause
will likely have to satisfy traditional liquidated damages requirements. Penalty
damages are generally outlawed.194 Instead, contractually prescribed damages must
bear a reasonable relationship to the potential harm caused by a breach.' 95
As a result, escalation clauses should bear some relation to damages the patentee
might sustain. The question of damages is complicated, however, as the "damages" are
not for a breach of a covenant not to challenge because such covenants cannot be
enforced. It is unlikely that a court will uphold "damages" for a nonbreaching
challenge. Thus, escalation clauses should not be styled as liquidated damages
provisions; they should, however, still avoid the imprimatur of penalty, so that courts
will not invalidate them under liquidated-damages principles.
The tax would be minimized even further if the patentee could collect and retain
escalated royalties commencing with the challenge and regardless of outcome (swe
becomes se because winning is no longer a condition), but such a result is unlikely.
Even if royalties are not escrowed pending litigation, the licensee's obligation to payassuming a successful challenge--ceases at the filing of the lawsuit.196 Although it

192. See Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 780 F.2d 991, 995 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("This public
policy statement [in Lear] does permit a licensee to cease payments due under a contract while
challenging the validity of a patent. It does not permit the licensees to avoid facing the
consequences that such an action would bring." (emphasis in original)); In re Yam Processing

Patent Validity Litig., 541 F.2d 1127, 1140 (5th Cir. 1976) ("In [Brulotte] the collection of use
royalties was deemed illegal only after the expiration of the last patent. Here the royalties are
collected under unexpired double heater patents. Normally, a patent holder may charge whatever
it likes for a license."); Wallace Clark & Co. v. Acheson Indus., Inc., 401 F. Supp. 637,639-40
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (stating that a minimum royalty provision not void under Lear because licensee
may still challenge validity), affd 532 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1976); Am. Photocopy Equip. Co. v.
Rovico, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 192, 199 (N.D. Ill. 1966) ("[I]t is not a violation ofthe anti-trust laws
for a patentee to grant a license under his patentfor any royalty or upon any condition the
performance of which is reasonably within the reward which the patentee by the grant of the
patent is entitled to secure. This, of course, is not to say that the patentee is free to expand his
statutory monopoly, as where royalties are to be paid after the patent has expired." (emphasis in
original)).
193. See Bleeker & O'Shaughnessy, supranote 9, at 434; Dreyfuss & Pope, supranote 9, at
1001-02 ("Although the increase in the rate creates a disincentive and may seem inconsistent
with Lear, patents that have survived a challenge are generally perceived by the business
community as more valuable than untested patents."); cf. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co.,
440 U.S. 257,263 (1979) (approving license that reflects economics ofrelationship); Paice LLC
v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("In most cases, where the district
court determines that a permanent injunction is not warranted, the district court may wish to
allow the parties to negotiate a license amongst themselves regarding future use of a patented
invention before imposing an ongoing royalty.").
194. Ira Jay Levy, LitigationPlanningforLicensing Lawyers, in 2 JOsEPH YANG& IRA JAY
LEVY, ADVANCED LICENSING AGREEMENTS 2009 235, 257 (PLI Intellectual Prop., Course
Handbook Series No. 961, 2009).
195. Id.
196. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 673-74 (1969).

1038

INDIANA LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 85:1003

might appear that payment during pendency aids the patentee in defending the
challenge, 97 this benefit is illusory if the patentee loses, as the amount received will
have to be refunded 19s -the same result could be achieved with a loan. To avoid this
problem, the patentee might argue that the escalation is necessary, win or lose, to pay
for costs and fees. 199 A practical problem with this argument is that it undercuts any
fee-shifting clauses, which are discussed below. A patentee would ideally want both
escalation and fee shifting instead ofjust one of them.
The license also might include language that says nonrefundable royalties must be
paid until final determination, as suggested in Appendix II.5.C. 200 Subpart 1, above,
addresses the likely nonefficacy of this approach. If it were effective, however, the tax
would be lower.
If legal gambits to keep escalated royalties that accrue after the date of challenge
fail, the patentee will only be able to keep the incremental royalties if it wins the
challenge. Further, any uncertainty about timing will likely reduce the value of the
clause as a signal. The parties likely need not implement a two-tiered escalation like
that in Appendix II; a single rate going into effect at the time of challenge will provide
the maximum impact.
Thus, the tax effect will be proportional to the patentee's likelihood of winning,
which is necessarily smaller than a guaranteed royalty escalation. This leads to a
curious result: escalated royalties will have little effect on the tax associated with a
weak patent because patentees will likely never retain the increased royalty.
This surprisingly means that licensees facing weak patents can theoretically only
reduce their nuisance fee by also agreeing to much higher royalties if they challenge
the patent-the weaker the patent, the higher the escalation required.2° ' This is directly
contrary to the suggestion that licensees should counter escalation proposals with
requests for refunds if the patent is found invalid.20 2 Instead of demanding royalty
refunds (which will only drive the tax higher), licensees who do not want a challenge
should instead agree to significant royalty escalation.
Patentees might prefer these strategies to a terminate-on-challenge clause-legality
and deterrent effectiveness being equal-for four reasons. First, the patentee would
still have the benefit of other license provisions, such as use restrictions. Second, the

197. Collins & Cicero, supra note 114, at 754 ("Now, after MedImmune, licensors are
arguably more financially equipped to defend a patent challenge because licensees will continue
to pay royalties during the challenge, thus giving the licensor funds to pay the litigation costs.");
Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 9, at 1002 ("Imposing an increased royalty during the period of
challenge defrays the additional economic burden defending such a challenge imposes on the
patent holder.").
198. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 567 F.2d 184, 188 (2d Cir.1977)
("Ultimately, all royalties paid after the filing of the complaint may have to be returned to the
plaintiffs.").
199. For sample language, see infra App. II.2.B.
200. Kuwahara & Lavey, supranote 9, at 159-60.
201. Cf Dreyfiss & Pope, supra note 9, at 1003 ("In fact, the greater differential between
the two licensing rates--that is, the more the royalty is reduced for those licensees who are
willing to forgo a challenge-lthe more credible the argument that there is a social benefit to the
arrangement.").
202. See, e.g., Collins &Cicero, supranote 114, at 754 (suggesting that licensees will likely
.not accept escalation clauses unless they can get a refund as well if they win a challenge).
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patentee would not need to prove-up damages. Third, the increased royalty would
provide more certainty in the amount of damages. Fourth, weak patents have little
chance of garnering higher damages if a patent is challenged, such that the preset
royalty is the maximum amount the patent will earn. 20 3
Licensees might prefer such clauses for the same reason: they would still have the
benefit of a license (rather than injunction risk) and the increased payments resulting
from a failed challenge would be more certain. Furthermore, the lack of injunction risk
gives the patentee less holdup leverage to negotiate royalties-even escalated royalties.
3. Combination Licenses
A common licensing suggestion is to couple patent licenses with trade secret
licenses to overcome the rule that one may not license invalid patents, or to otherwise
apply royalties to value other than patents. 204 The theory is that even if the patent is
invalid, royalties must still be paid for the use of trade secrets. 20 5 This is the general
rule for multiple patents, which may be combined for a single royalty even if one
patent is later invalidated. 206 The theory manifests itself in the model two ways. First,
the benefits of challenge to licensees are reduced, which reduces the likelihood they
will bring challenges (s). Second, if there is a challenge, the patentee stands to lose
fewer royalties (r). Both effects reduce the tax.
The benefits of such coupling are limited, though. Courts have made clear that
license fees must be decreased when a patent is found invalid; 20 7 they treat a trade
2
secret license as less valuable than a combination patent and trade secret license. 08

203. The Medlmmune decision may have helped weak patentees by encouraging licensees to
continue with their agreements rather than breaching.
204. Collins & Cicero, supranote 114, at 754; Schlicher, supranote 5,at 385-86,391. For
sample language, see infra App. II.
205. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257,261-62 (1979) (finding alicense
for a patent which failed to issue still valid); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 675 (1969)
(refusing to void license to patent application prior to issuance, and leaving the question to state
courts).
206. See Hull v. Brunswick Corp., 704 F.2d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding that
escalation of royalties under one patent after expiration of a second patent is enforceable).
207. Zila, Inc. v. Tinnell, 502 F.3d 1014, 1021 (9th Cir. 2007) ("[A] contract that provides
for royalties either when a patent expires or when it fails to issue cannot be upheld unless it
provides a discount from the alternative, patent-protected rate."); see Meehan v. PPG Indus.,
Inc., 802 F.2d 881,883-84 (7th Cir. 1986); Boggild v. Kenner Prods., 776 F.2d 1315, 1319-20
(6th Cir. 1985) (stating that a license must distinguish between patent and nonpatent royalties);
Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1372-74 (1lth Cir. 1983); Span-Deck, Inc. v.
Fab-Con, Inc., 677 F.2d 1237, 1247 (8th Cir. 1982) (hybrid license must differentiate between
patent and nonpatent consideration); cf Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262
(1979) (holding that a royalty that decreases where a patent does not issue is enforceable);
American Sec. Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1959) (package patent
licensing is misuse if it is a sham).
208. But see Zila, 502 F.3d at 1021-22 ("This understanding, however, may well overread
both Brulotte and Aronson, by glossing over the unique and onerous contractual restrictions at
issue in Brulotte and relying on a sentence in Aronson that is really only dicta ....In short,
were we writing on a clean slate, we might be inclined to read the dicta in Aronson as
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Unlike licenses for multiple patents, trade secret licenses may not be combined with
potentially invalid patents, at least not at the same royalty rate.2 9 Instead, patentees are
required to assign some defensible value on the patent license that is distinct from the
combined royalty, and the patentee loses that portion of the royalty upon a successful
challenge.
Additionally, only royalties for the current licenses would be saved. Other licenses
(r) might still be lost if they were not joint licenses. Of course, if other licenses do
include a trade secret component, then only a portion of other royalties would be lost.
Despite these limitations, saving some of the license fee without the patent is better
than saving none, so joint licenses do more good than harm with respect to the tax. If,
however, licensees view the separate trade secret license as distinct from a "simple"
patent license, then it may not differentiate the tax from a premium for an unnecessary
trade secret license, making a successful negotiation more difficult.
4. Fee Shifting
Licenses that include fee-shifting provisions 21° would reduce the tax. As with many
of these suggestions, traditional fee shifting potentially increases the cost to the
licensee, thus making a challenge less likely (s). It also decreases the potential
litigation costs borne by the patentee if the challenge is unsuccessful. The decrease is
conditional, however, because
the fees would only be recoverable ifthe patentee wins
211
(reducing the tax by swc).
The tax could be reduced even more by uncommon but aggressive fee shifting. The
most aggressive provision would require the licensee to pay all of the patentee's
attorneys' fees and costs21 2 from the time of challenge, win or lose. 213 Such an
agreement would exert the most pressure not to challenge (s) and would also
unconditionally eliminate the patentee's litigation costs (reducing the tax by sc). Any
incremental fee-shifting arrangement between traditional fee shifting and the
aggressive shifting proposed here would have a commensurate incremental effect.
Traditional fee shifting is likely to be legal; many contracts, including patent
licenses, include fee shifting against losing parties. 21 4 Further, traditional fee shifting is
unlikely to be found unenforceable as a barrier to challenges under Lear because a

nonbinding in light of what appears on its face to be a very limited holding in Brulotte. By
doing so, we would largely avoid attributing to the Supreme Court in Brulotte and Aronson the
lack of economic logic laid at its feet.").
209. Zila, 502 F.3d at 1021.
210. See Bleeker & O'Shaughnessy, supranote 9, at 433; Collins & Cicero, supranote 114,
at 754; Kuwahara & Lavey, supra note 9, atl60; Schlicher, supra note 5, at 391. For sample
language, see infra App. II.2.C-D.
211. Some states, such as California, require fee shifting to be mutual. CAL. CIV. CODE §
1717 (2009). Mutual fee shifting would decrease the impact of such a clause, especially for
weak patents.
212. This includes nontaxable costs, such as expert fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2006).
213. Collins & Cicero, supranote 114, at 755 (suggesting a hybrid whereby fees shift if any
of the challenged claims are upheld).
214. See Allan Block Corp. v. County Materials Corp., 512 F.3d 912, 920 (7th Cir. 2008);
Kelly Casey Mullally, Gregory Castanias & Franklin E. Gibbs, MedImmune v. Genentech, 4 J.
Bus. &TECH. L. 59, 77 (2009).
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215
failed patent challenge does not create the social benefit of invalidating bad patents.
While good challenges should be encouraged, bad challenges should be discouraged
because they create unwarranted social costs. Shifting litigation costs to the winner of
litigation may be preferable to royalty escalation because escalation is untested.
Patentees must be careful, however, to ensure that fee shifting is available; perhaps
they are currently not so careful, as there appear to be no published cases granting
either party fees in a patent invalidity or infringement challenge action. This may be for
two reasons. First, the clause must be clear that a challenge will give rise to fee
shifting. 21 6 For example, a declaratory-relief action might not be considered an action
on the contract, 217 so any clause must be sure to include that option. Second, and more
important, if the patentee exercises a termination right then the fee-shifting provision
may no longer be in effect. A simple solution would be to ensure that fee-shifting
provisions survive termination of the license. In any event, unclear fee-shifting clauses
decrease the risk of challenge for licensees, which in turn makes challenge more likely,
partially offsetting the effects of a fee-shifting clause.
Fee shifting not based on the outcome is more likely to be an unenforceable
impediment to patent challenges. The theory is that fee shifting will remove the
incentive to challenge if the licensee must pay win or lose.21 s However, cases that
imply that any disincentive to challenge is void can be distinguished. In Timely
Products,Inc. v. Constanzo, for example, the "impediment" was that the licensee had
to pay royalties even if the patent were invalid.219 With fee shifting, the impediment is
present whether or not the challenge is successful, but it does not create a continuing
royalty obligation if the challenge is successful. Patentees might argue that a onetime
cost to challenge is an acceptable contract provision; after all, licensees must bear their
own litigation costs-they cannot argue that litigation costs generally are an
unreasonable impediment to challenge.
If legal, mandatory fee- and cost-shifting clauses might be a license's most
persuasive signals, especially with respect to weak patents (nuisance licenses). As
discussed above, if a patentee assumes it will lose in litigation, then royalty escalation
will have little effect because the patentee expects it will never see those royalties.

215. Schlicher, supra note 5, at 391.
216. See, e.g., Allan Block Corp. v. County Materials Corp., 512 F.3d at 920-21 (holding
that "collection" fee-shifting clause does not warrant shifting in patent licensing dispute).
217. Digital Angel Corp. v. Allflex USA, Inc., No. 04-4545ADMAJB, 2005 WL 2464942, at
*2 (D. Minn. Oct. 6, 2005) (holding that infringement claim does not fall under contract for feeshifting clause). Licensees will have tough choices to make-they may want to allege a contract
action for jurisdiction/forum-selection reasons, but doing so may bring them within contractual
fee-shifting provisions.
218. Span-Deck, Inc. v. Fab-Con, Inc., 677 F.2d 1237, 1247 n.12 (8th Cir. 1982) ("If
[royalties were] held enforceable despite patent validity, such an agreement would prevent the
'unmuzzling' of royalties to aid the licensee in the expense of challenging patent validity, which
achieves a result directly contradictory to that sought in Lear."); Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Allied
Chem. Corp. 567 F.2d 184, 187-88 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that a licensee need not terminate a
license to challenge a patent, as that would reduce incentive to challenge); Timely Prods., Inc. v.
Constanzo, 465 F. Supp. 91, 96 (D. Conn. 1979) (stating that any provision that removes
incentives to challenge are void).
219. Timely Prods., 465 F. Supp. at 96.
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Thus, the risk of litigation costs becomes the most variable portion of the tax; patentees
do not want to lose their patent and pay high costs doing so.
Negating litigation costs by both reducing the chance and costs of challenge can
have a much larger percentage effect on the tax. Like escalated royalties, a licensee that
has determined a nuisance fee is the best way to settle a matter can pay the lowest
guaranteed fee by promising to pay the highest litigation costs. In fact, combining fee
shifting with escalated royalties would likely best minimize the tax.
As discussed above, royalty escalation and fee shifting are likely to be the best and
most palatable patent-tax reduction strategies for all parties.
F.Dispute-ResolutionStrategies
1. Venue Selection
An agreement to bring any challenge in a local jurisdiction 220 or ina defensible
"patent-friendly" jurisdiction affects the challenge tax in a few ways. First, if the
licensee is not local, it increases the costs of a challenge, thus decreasing the likelihood
of a challenge (s). Second, such a provision would minimize the patentee's litigation
costs (c). Third, the patentee might perceive a higher chance of winning (either by
hometown effect or by a "patent-friendly" venue), which would decrease the potential
lost revenue ((J-w)r). If the venue is remote but patent friendly, one would expect a
decrease in tax only if the effect on revenues outweighs the costs associated with
litigating ina foreign venue; because revenues are contingent on winning the challenge
but costs are certain win or lose, the effect is ambiguous.
A venue provision illustrates the logical difficulties associated with interpreting
Learto void all contract provisions that reduce incentives to challenge. Surely a venue
provision makes it more costly to challenge, but just as surely such a provision is
enforceable as a reasonably negotiated license term.221 This apparent paradox
illustrates the limits of Lear-at some point "patent policy" must give way to private
ordering. Exactly where that line should be drawn, of course, is subject to much debate.
2. Arbitration Clauses
Licensees might agree to arbitrate any disputes to lower the tax. 222 The tax will be
lowered to the extent the patentee believes the licensee is less likely to win a challenge
in arbitration.223 If so, arbitration would lower the chance of lost royalties ((1 - w)r).
Also, if licensees perceive the same shift in chances, it would make them less likely to
challenge (S).224

220. Bleeker & O'Shaughnessy, supra note 9, at 433; Collins & Cicero, supra note 114, at
755-56; Kuwahara & Lavey, supra note 9, at 160; For sample language see infraApp. II.3.A.
221. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1294-95 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
222. Collins & Cicero, supranote 114, at 755; Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 9, at 999-1001;
Schlicher, supranote 5, at 392. For sample language, see infra App. II.3.B.
223. Cf Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 9, at 1000 ("For the licensee, the problem is that the
arbitrator may be more deferential to the PTO than judges, making it less likely that a challenge
to the patent will win.").
224. But see Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 9, at 1000 ("Accordingly, there is a risk that the
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More important, even if chances of winning in arbitration were identical to those of
winning a lawsuit, two other considerations might lower the tax. First, to the extent that
arbitration is faster and cheaper the cost of a challenge (c) would be reduced,
especially if the parties agree to streamlined procedures. 225 Second, if an arbitration
award could be kept confidential, the patentee's potential losses would be truncated
226
because the patentee would not lose revenue associated with other licenses ((1-wr).
Arbitration clauses might not have the desired effects, however. First, patentees
might not believe they will do as well in arbitration such that the chance of winning is
actually lower, and thus the expected lost revenue is higher. Second, arbitration may
not be cheaper than litigation, depending on the particular terms, such that costs (c) are
higher rather than lower. Third, secrecy cuts both ways; a confidential win by the
patentee means that the patentee cannot seek enhanced royalties from future licensees
from a stronger patent (w'e). Fourth, the lack of a thorough appellate procedure
increases the patentee's uncertainty about the above variables, which has the effect of
raising the tax, especially for risk averse patentees.
Use of an arbitration clause in this way may have a couple legal impediments as
well. First, the likelihood of actually keeping the ruling confidential is low, in part
because arbitration awards, including a copy of the award,must be reported to the
227
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to be included in the file for the patent at issue.
Additionally, any challenge to the arbitration award will cause publication of the award
through the docket, if not as part of the opinion. 228 Lack of secrecy does mean,
however, that a winning patentee can seek higher royalties from future licensees, which
would decrease the tax.
To be sure, the award is not enforceable unless it is filed with the PTO, 229 but it is
difficult to imagine a winning licensee not filing such an award.230 Additionally, while
an award "shall have no force or effect on any other person,, 23' nonmutual collateral
estoppel will make an invalidity finding binding on the patentee,232 which is
presumably why awards must be filed with the PTO in the first place. Thus, the only
reduced cost will make the licensee too ready to challenge the patent.").
225. See P. Jean Baker, PatentLitigation:A Radically ChangedEnvironmentforLicensors
andLicensees, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Feb. 2008, at 12, 15; Dreyfuss &Pope, supranote 9,
at 1000 ("For example, if the parties are concerned about resources, they could limit discovery
and the overall length of the proceeding.").
226. Dreyfuss & Pope, supranote 9, at 999-1000 ("So long as the parties agree to keep the
record of the arbitration-including any evidence presented and any arguments made to the
tribunal---confidential, then even a successful challenge will not invalidate the patent or even
provide information to other licensees, potential licensees, or possible challengers.").
227. 35 U.S.C. § 294(d) (2006); 37 C.F.R. § 1.335(b) (2009).
228. See, e.g., Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
229. Baker, supranote 225, at 15.
230. Arguably the contract could bar such action, but attempts to do so are likely
unenforceable given the specific statutory mandate.
231. 35 U.S.C. § 294(c).
232. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971) (finding
nonmutual collateral estoppel against the patentee); see also Cobra N. Am., LLC v. Cold Cut
Sys. Svenska AB, No. 08-cv-00873-DME-CBS, 2008 WL 5216290, at *6 (D. Colo. Dec. 11,
2008) (stating that an arbitration award sheds light on argument made in separate litigation);
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 610, 613 (S.D. Ind. 2001)
(holding that an award is binding on parties and those in privity with them).
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way to keep the basis for an award secret would be to request that the arbitrator just
issue a decision in favor of each party with no explanation. Such an option will hardly
be palatable for patentees and licensees alike.233
Second, even if the award were secret, patentees seeking to license patents
adjudicated to be invalid (in any venue) face risks. Such licensing would be considered
patent misuse and might even be considered an antitrust violation. 234 This might render
the patent unenforceable at best and subject the patentee to damages at worst. Thus,
patentees might be hesitant to continue licensing a patent adjudicated invalid in a secret
arbitration proceeding. 35
Dispute-resolution strategies are certainly legal and may even be practical, but they
are unlikely to be effective in reducing the tax.
CONCLUSION

While many believe that the patent-challenge right is unsettled, this Article shows
that no court since Learhas upheld a covenant not to challenge a patent, and that such
provisions have been disfavored by the Supreme Court for more than one hundred
years. It is possible that courts may begin to respect the finality of patent licenses, but
there is no strong indication that they will do so any time soon.
Licensee ability to obtain protection from infringement claims while simultaneously
attacking the patent decreases the expected benefits patentees receive from any
agreement. Thus, the challenge right imposes a form of tax on patentees which is
passed through to licensees and consumers. This tax may be worthwhile if it generates
sufficient social benefit, but at the individual transaction level, licensees who do not
plan to challenge the patent might want to reduce the tax by agreeing to terms that
make challenge less likely.
The terms that are most likely to be effective-other than the explicit promise to
challenge which is now unenforceable-are those that most increase the cost to the
licensee in case of challenge. For example agreeing to pay nonrefundable escalated
royalties during the pendency of the challenge or agreeing to pay, win or lose, for all
the patentee's attorneys' fees are likely to have the most impact on the challenge tax.
Unfortunately, these highly effective methods are also most likely to be void.

233. Among other things, such an award would have no basis for challenge in court, no
matter how wrong the arbitrator might be. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006) (delineating narrow areas
for overturning arbitration awards).
234. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135 (1969); United
States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 387 (1948); Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601
F.2d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that knowingly attempting to enforce an invalid patent
can be an antitrust violation); Transitron Elec. Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 487 F. Supp. 885,
893 (D. Mass. 1980) (attempting to enforce an invalid patent is misuse); Lawrence Schlam,
Compulsory Royalty-FreeLicensing as anAntitrust Remedyfor PatentFraud-Law, Policyand
the Patent-AntitrustInterface Revisited, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 467, 493 (1998).

235. Even secret awards would likely be discoverable in later proceedings. Cf Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 290 (D. Del. 1985) ("Except for a few
privileged matters, nothing is sacred in civil litigation; even the legendary barriers erected by
The Coca-Cola Company to keep its formulae from the world must fall if the formulae are
needed to allow plaintiffs and the Court to determine the truth in these disputes.").
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The difficulty is identifying those methods which are both effective and legal. This
Article suggests that the best alternatives also increase costs through escalating
royalties and fee shifting, but only do so when the licensee loses the challenge. These
strategies have the benefit of lowering the patentee's expected cost, but they are also
likely legal because they only increase the licensee's costs if the challenge is
unsuccessful. These choices are also likely to be more palatable to both parties than
terminate-on-challenge provisions.
There are a three broader policy issues identified in this Article. First, courts and
many commentators have given too little attention to the social costs of policies that
encourage invalidation of bad patents. To be sure, licensees just might be society's best
hope for invalidating patents, but this is not a costless proposition.
Second, given social costs, it may be optimal to allow at least some licensees to
promise not to challenge patents. Doing so would reduce the deadweight loss
associated with the tax, while not significantly affecting the number of patent
challenges because agreeing licensees will usually not want to challenge in the first
place. 236 Allowing no-challenge clauses may not advance the goal of invalidating every
bad patent, but so long as parties can seek other ways of limiting challenges and so
long as licensees were not going to challenge anyway, then little is lost. Of course,
licensees might want the option to challenge later, in which case they should not agree
to a no-challenge provision and pay the increase royalty associated with the challenge
tax. Alternatively, they could agree to pay escalated royalties if they lose, and then
challenge only if there is significant value in doing so.
Third, varying the right to challenge depending on context might be an appropriate
middle ground that can reduce social costs. For example, no-challenge provisions
could be binding ifthe licensed patent has survived challenge in the past. Additionally,
courts could impose mandatory fee shifting for failed challenges. Alternatively,
arbitration clauses could be given nonpreclusive effect as to other licensees. These and
other policies might encourage challenges where the benefits exceed the costs, but
discourage challenges where the costs exceed the benefits.

236. Some might eventually want to challenge, or else such agreements would never have
been tested in court.
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APPENDIX I: A SIMPLE LICENSING/LITIGATION MODEL

This licensing/litigation model outlines basic probabilistic choices facing a potential
patentee/licensor and, by extension, a licensee. The model makes several simplifying
assumptions, including among others: (1) that the patentee can make some reasonable
estimate of probabilities and damages; (2) that the potential costs and damages are
fixed ex ante; (3) that choices are single play, such that a single-percentage chance
rather than a probability distribution represents expected value; (4) that the choice is
between licensing and litigation; 237 and (5) that the parties are risk neutral.
These assumptions could be adjusted in different ways, resulting in a much more
complex model. Because the general conclusions are driven primarily by the choices
facing the patentee, additional complexity should not vary the conclusions of the
model.
A. Licensing Outcome
The licensing outcome (R) is the result of a negotiated agreement, represented by:
(1) R=r
where r = the present value of a royalty stream for the license. 238 Here r is generally a
function of four factors:
(2)

r =Aw,dc,m)

where w equals the probability of winning in litigation, 239 d equals the damages
associated with winning, 240 m equals market-based factors, and c equals the cost of
litigation with a particular licensee. 24 1 The litigation cost also includes losses
associated with the challenger's potential right to pay royalties into escrow during the
pendency of the lawsuit, which might range from loss of interest on the royalties during
the pendency of litigation to the entire value of the business ifthe loss of royalty stream
puts the company out of business.
To be sure, there are many market factors that can affect rates, such as the
24 3
24 2
comparable licenses and industry standards,
patentee's opportunity costs,

237. Many patentees may choose not to take any action, including licensing, where odds of
winning are low and litigation costs are high. This discussion assumes that such is not the case,
but the model is easily extended to include "no action" choices.
238. All values discussed throughout are present value.
239. In turn, w = i * v, where i is the probability that the accused product infringes and v is
the probability that the patent at issue is valid. These two probabilities can vary independently,
but where i and v are both low the likelihood of winning is lowest.
240. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 82, at 2000 (stating that a baseline royalty based on
reasonable royalty courts might apply).
241. See Schlicher, supranote 5, at 373.

242. See id. at 375.
243. O'Connor, supra note 9, at 452.
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negotiating skills, 2 " proxies for strength of the patent,245 and technology
alternatives. 246 However, even these are derived over time from the potential value of
the patent and the potential damages in litigation.
After all, a reasonable royalty in
247
litigation may be the industry-standard royalty.
The exact function will differ, but the important proposition is that any royalty will
already be discounted for litigation risk. 248 Thus, one would expect r to be lower when
the likelihood of winning is lower, the possible damages are lower, and the costs of
litigation are higher.
B. Litigation Outcome
The alternative to a licensed outcome R is litigation. In litigation, the patentee can
win damages:
(3)d=r+e
where e is some enhancement above the licensed outcome. Here e consists of two
parts. First, it includes full compensatory damages, such as lost profits or reasonable
royalties, instead of the discounted amount that a patentee might agree to in order to
avoid litigation. Second, it includes possible damage enhancements, such treble
damages for willful infringement or attorneys' fees. Thus, e is likely bimodal: it will be
largest where w is low and thus r is most discounted and also where w is high and thus
larger damages are available.
The litigation outcome (L) that patentees face is:
(4) L = wd - c = w(r + e) - c = wr + we - c
In plain language, the litigation outcome is the chance of winning times the potential
damages (probability adjusted/expected damages) less the costs associated with
litigation. 249

244. F. Russell Denton &Paul J. Heald, Random Walks, Non-CooperativeGames, andthe
Complex Mathematics of PatentPricing,55 RUTGERS L. REv. 1175, 1281 (2003) (discussing
effect of negotiating tactics on pricing).
245. John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, Kimberly A. Moore & R. Derek Trunkey, Valuable
Patents,92 GEO. L.J. 435 (2004) (discussing attributes of valuable patents); Michael S. Kramer,
Valuation andAssessment of PatentsandPatentPortfolios Through Analytical Techniques, 6 J.
MARsHALL REv. INTELL. PROP. L. 463 (2007) (discussing licensing based on "essential" patents).
246. See generally Ted Hagelin, A New Method to Value IntellectualProperty,30 AIPLA
Q.J. 353 (2002) (discussing various valuation techniques).
247. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
248. Schlicher, supra note 5, at 376 (arguing that the parties will set royalties based on
expected litigation outcomes rather than the commercial outcomes).
249. Ostensibly, e must be greater than c, or else it would never make sense to litigate, even
with a one hundred percent chance of winning. Id. at 375.
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C. The LicensingDiscount
Subtracting the licensing outcome from the litigation' outcome yields the discount
that a licensee gives to the licensor, even if the specific function of each component is
unavailable. The discount can be represented as:
(5) L - R = wr + we - c - r = we + (wr - r) - c =
(6) (we - c) + r(w - 1) =
(7) (we - c) - (1 - w)r
Note that (1 - w) is the probability of loss. Thus, equation 7 makes intuitive sense-the
expected license discount is the expected additional litigation damages after costs (we c) less the expected opportunity cost of giving up the license if the patentee litigates
and loses ((1 - w)r). If the patentee is risk neutral, then it would litigate whenever
(8) (we - c) > (I - w)r
Equation 8 makes intuitive sense as well-if the patentee expects to gain more from
litigation than it might lose by giving up the licensing opportunity, then it will do so.
D. The Patent Challenge Outcome
The model thus far does not include consideration of postagreement challenges. The
ability for the licensee to challenge a patent ex post will affect the ex ante value of the
license for both the patentee and the licensee. This introduces a new variable into the
model-the probability that the licensee will challenge the patent after entering into a
license:
(9) s =ftw,re,c,m,xyvz)
where x, y, and z represent whatever factors might be important to the licensee, such as
alternatives, design-around costs, the importance of the licensed invention to the
product, bad- or good-will, and any other factor that might affect the licensee's
decision to sue.25°
The likelihood that a licensee will challenge (s) will affect the patentee's expected
outcome. The new patent challenge expectation (S) is represented by:
(10) S = (I - s)r + s(wr - c) =
(11) r - sr + swr - sc = r - (1 - w)sr - sc
Equation 10 combines the licensing (r) and litigation (wr - c) outcomes, weighting each
outcome by the likelihood that it will happen (I - s and S).251 Equation 11 is a
restatement-the expected patent challenge outcome is the license fee (r) less the

250. A more complex version of the model might vary s and r (and even w) over time.
251. Schlicher, supra note 5, at 373 (presenting a similar model, but assuming that the
patentee will always challenge outcome).
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chance of being challenged and losing (i.e., sir, where I is the chance of losing), less
litigation costs if challenged (sc).
Note that the patent challenge outcome, S, is different than the litigation outcome, L,
which is presented in Equation 4. This is because the licensee may continue paying r
during litigation (and after) if it loses. Thus,
the patentee can no longer seek damage
25 2
enhancements to r (that is, e) in litigation.
The result is a two-way truncation of the patentee's expected outcome. First, if the
licensee sues and wins, the patentee receives nothing.253 Second, if the licensee sues
and loses, the patentee wins no more than r and must bear litigation costs in any event.
E. The Patent Challenge Tax
Because the patent challenge outcome also differs from the negotiated licensing
outcome, the ability for licensees to challenge the patent imposes a cost on the patentee
that would be absent without the challenge right. This cost means that the value of any
license is less than whatever royalty is agreed, such that the patentee will have to
charge a higher royalty to obtain the same value it would have had without the
challenge right. The cost (7) for any given royalty rate is represented by:
(12) R - S = r - (r - (1 - w)sr - sc) =
(13) (1 - w)sr + sc = s((] - w)r + c)
Equation 13 seems to track a patentee's likely thought process. The additional
expected cost on the patentee is the probability of challenge (s) times the probability of
loss (1 - w) times the value of the lost license (r) (i.e., sir, where I is probability of loss
- 1 - w) plus the probabilistic costs of suit (sc) which are independent of wi/).254
F. Rationality of the License Decision
Given the additional cost imposed on the patentee, the rationality of a patentee
entering any license agreement must be reexamined. Equation 8 implies that a patentee
will license if(we - c) > (1 - w)r. Now the patentee must consider the patent challenge
outcome versus the litigation outcome. Given additional costs, the new decision is
represented by:
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)

S > L => (1 - s)r + s(wr - c) > wr + we - c =>
r - sr + swr - sc > wr + we - c =>
r - sr + swr - wr + c - sc > we =>
r - sr +w(sr- r) + (c - sc) > we =>

252. Cf. id. at 377-78 (discussing the effect of license termination on potential infringement
damages).
253. See O'Connor, supra note 9, at 447. This too is a simplification: it is unlikely that the
licensee will essentially sue one day after execution of the license. In reality, r would be reduced
rather than eliminated because the licensee would be paying royalties for some period of time.
254. Cf Schlicher, supra note 5, at 380 (arguing that the patentees will only license if the
royalty is doubled). Schlicber uses a different methodology for determining license pricing,
which assumes that the likelihood of suit (s) is one hundred percent.
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(18) (1 - s)(1 - w)r+ (I - s)c > we
Equation 18 implies that a licensee will choose to license whenever the expected
marginal loss associated with litigation exceeds the expected enhancement to fees.
Textually, a patentee will prefer a license when the worst case scenario of litigating
(the loss of license fees ((1 - w)r) plus anticipated litigation costs (c) where the licensee
would not have challenged (I - s) would cost more than the potential marginal benefit
of litigation (the expected extra damages that might be obtained in litigation (we)).255
The first half of the equation, the potential downside of litigation, is considered only to
the extent that the licensee would not have challenged. If the licensee is going to
challenge anyway (s), then the potential losses are the same for the patentee whether it
chooses to litigate or license.
An example may better explain this choice. Assume that Patentee licenses the '123
patent to Licensee for $100, which will be paid over a period of years. This payment
represents a discount, because Patentee would have obtained $150 in litigation, though
it would have cost $25 to try the case. However, Patentee knew it would only win in
litigation 40% of the time, so it was willing to negotiate the discount. However,
Patentee knows Licensee is unhappy with the $100 due to the weakness of the patent
and that Licensee has a 50% chance of challenging the patent.
Patentee's expected outcome from the license is $67.50. This is 50% * $100 (or
$50), if Licensee does not challenge, plus 50% * 40% * $75 (or $17.50) if the Licensee
does challenge. The $75 is the amount of recovered royalties less the litigation cost.
Patentee's expected outcome from litigation is $35. This is 40% * $150 (or $60)
minus $25 in litigation costs. The $150 is the amount of the royalty ($100) plus the
additional damages it would gain in litigation ($50).
Based on these expected outcomes, Patentee would prefer to license every time,
even though it is only receiving $67.50 of expected value for a $100 license. From a
different perspective, it also means that the patentee is charging $32.50 more than it
needs to in order to obtain the same value. This means one of two things. Either first,
Patentee may charge more than $100256 to get to a desired royalty of $ 100. Or second,
Licensee might have paid as little as $67.50 with no challenge right for the same
license to give the patentee the same value it gets for a $100 with the challenge right.
While actual license pricing will depend on Patentee and Licensee and the initial
baseline, 7if no challenge were possible, Licensee would likely pay less for the
25
license.

255. Id. (discussing the effect of MedImmune on patentee choices between licensing and
litigation). Schlicher does not incorporate the chance that the licensee will not sue into the
decision-making considerations; he assumes that the licensee will always challenge the patent
whenever potential royalties exceed litigation costs. The result is that patentees would refuse to
license unless they obtained twice the royalty or more, assuming the patent is fifty percent likely
to be valid. Id. These assumptions seem unlikely, given that patent licensing has not ground to a
halt in the wake of Medlmmune.
256. Patentee would charge $50 more to reach a desired royalty of$100:(.5 * 150) +.5(.4 *
(150 - 25)) = 100. This means that for a $150 royalty, the tax portion is $50.
257. Schlicher, supra note 5, at 373-75, discusses why the licensee is unlikely to pay as little
as the litigation outcome. Additionally, after application of the tax, a "litigation outcome"
royalty would mean that the patentee would do worse licensing than simply litigating, and the
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The following is the application of the above in the economic model, using $100 as
the baseline. Assume that r = $100, e = $50, w = 40% (.4), s = 50% (.5), and c = $25.
Using Equation 14:
(19) S = (1 - .5)100 + .5(.4*100 - 25) = 50 + 17.5 = 67.5
(20) L = (.4*100) + (.4*50) - 25 = 40 + 20 - 25 = 35
Thus S > L, and the decision to license makes sense, even though the license has less
value to the patentee than it would have if s were zero. Where s = 0, the no-challenge
license outcome (R) is r = $100, making T(R - S) = $32.50. This represents the amount
of costs imposed on the patentee for a royalty of $100.
G. The Multiple Licensee Assumption
Incorporating into the model the risk of losing future licensees due to patent
invalidity amplifies the tax in most cases. The model is easily adjusted to incorporate
multiple licensees. The multiple licensee model here assumes that only one licensee
will sue. Allowing multiple licensees to sue would complicate the model in a variety of
ways. First, after one licensee challenges the patent, the probability of challenge by
others may increase-a "piling on" effect. Second, the outcome of one suit will affect
the likelihood that the patentee will win later suits. Third, the potential lost royalties are
at risk multiple times, which changes their expected value.
The single suit assumption is reasonable with respect to royalty decisions. At the
point of license, all past challenges are known, such that they can be incorporated into
the royalty calculation. Thus, the patentee would ask whether the new licensee will be
the one who will challenge and cause a loss of all future royalties from all licensees.
First, a new variable (r) can represent the present value of other licenses. We might
expect r'> r for two reasons. First, r' represents multiple licenses, whereas r represents
only one. Second, follow-on licensees might pay a premium based on prior licenseesthe more licensees, the stronger the patent. 258 However, one may not predict which
licensee will actually challenge the patent, and the model's outcome does not hinge on
the relationship between r and r'. 25 9 The total income stream to a patentee (R ) is r' + r.
This increases the
stakes of any challenge, because a loss in one case leads to a loss of
260
future licenses.
Second, a new variable (e) can represent additional royalties available from future
licensees. 261 The theory behind this variable is that any litigation win (which results in

patentee would choose to litigate rather than license.
258. Cf Kim, supranote 100, at 635 (finding that firms with prior license experience tend to
have more future licenses). But see Sudarshan, supra note 84, at 172 (arguing that nuisance
settlements for weak patents can also lead to future licenses). Sudarshan's findings do not
weaken the model; any win, even a nuisance settlement, will enhance patent value. Whether this
outcome is socially optimal is different than the private choices patentees face.
259. In the limiting case, r' is zero when there are no other licensees. Further, r' could
represent anticipated future licenses; the patentee's perception is more important than reality.
260. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971) (applying
the doctrine of nonmutual collateral estoppel against the patentee).
261. This is, of course, a great simplification. A more complex model would separate future
royalties and future damages enhancements if the patentee chose to litigate against future
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e') will increase the probability of winning in future litigation, which
262 will allow
patentees to secure higher royalty rates (r' + e') from future licensees.
Third, a new variable (w') reflects that a small component of w is based on the
specific accused product, and thus might not relate to future licensees. Thus, there is a
way for the patentee to lose any particular challenge (1 - w) in such a way that future
royalties are not affected.263 Here, w'> w represents the probability that the patentee
will "win" a portion of the litigation by being able to enforce the patent in the future.
Thus, the analytical framework of the basic model is essentially unchanged, but the
amounts at stake for the patentee would increase while the amounts at stake for the
licensee would remain the same as the single-licensee model. The following are new
licensing (R), litigation (Lr), and litigation/licensing decision (L'- R') outcomes:
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)

R'= r + r'
L'= w(r + e) + w'(r' + e) - c = wr + we + w'r' + w'e' - c
L'- R'= wr + we + w'r'+w'e'- c - r - r'=
we + w'e'- ((1 - w)r + (I- w'r) - c

Equation 24 implies that the litigation/licensing decision is similar to that in Equation
8. If expected gains from future licenses exceed the risk of loss of current licenses
(including the case at bar), then the patentee will choose to litigate. As the stakes
increase, the role of litigation costs will decrease.
The patent challenge outcome (S') now looks like this:
(25) S'= ( - s)(r + r) + s(wr + wr'+w'e'- c)
(26) r + r' - sr - sr' + swr + sw'r' + sw'e' - sc =
(27) r + r' - s[(] - w)r + (1 - w')r' - w'e' + c]

=

Equation 27 is similar to the single-licensee result in Equation 10 to the extent that
Equation 27 deducts the likely chances of losing other licensing revenues from current
revenues while not allowing for the possibility of enhanced damages in litigation (e).
However, the multilicense scenario adds something new: the possibility of enhanced
future license fees if the licensee wins the challenge (sw'e). Whether this results in a
better outcome than the single-licensee model (that is, whether S'> S) will depend on
whether the risk adjusted value of future fees is higher than the risk adjusted value of
losing current fees. If future opportunities are rich enough, patentees might well prefer
a challenge to a continuing license.
The multilicensee tax (T) now looks like this:

infringers, because there is a separate probability for each future possibility. The simplified
model bundles both probabilities into w', which cannot account for all of the potential variation
in outcomes.
262. O'Connor, supra note 9, at 445-46. If the game were played multiple times, then r
would increase with successive wins and e would increase, but at a slower rate due to
diminishing returns as w trends toward one hundred percent likelihood of win.
263. Specifically, w' = v * i', where v is the probability the patent will be found valid and i'is
the probability that an infringement finding (good or bad) will not affect future licensees. Here
i' will be lowest where the patentee cannot prove infringement and future licensees have
products identical to the product in litigation, such that the patentee will not be able to prove
infringement there either.
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(28) T'= r + r' - (r + r' -s[(1 - w)r + (1
- w)r' - w'e' - c] =
264
(29) s[(1 - w)r + (1 - w')r' - w'e' + c]
The effect of multiple licensees on the tax can be determined:
(30) T'> T => s((] - w)r + (1 - wr'-w'e'+ c) > s((] - w)r + c) =>
(31) (1 - w)r + (1 - w')r'- w'e'+ c > (1 - w)r + c =>
(32) (1 - w)r'- w'e'> 0 => (1 - wfr'> w'e'
The implication of Equation 32 results directly from the implication in Equation 27;
the tax will be higher where the chance of losing all royalties exceeds the possibility of
securing higher royalties by winning. Note that the difference between T' and T is
independent of the particular license at issue-the marginal cost of the patent challenge
right where multiple licenses are at stake is based only on the value ofnonlitigated (and
future) licenses.265
This difference implies that patentees entering a single exclusive license do not face
a tax any higher than they would if they entered a single nonexclusive license. This
result is contrary to arguments that exclusive licenses cause greater harm to patentees
because they cannot seek other licenses if there is a patent challenge. 266 A rational
patentee would consider the cost of exclusivity (and risk of losing future exclusive
royalties) as part of the tax and part of that cost would be passed on to licensees.
Patentees unable to find an exclusive licensee willing to pay such a premium would
charge less for nonexclusive licenses.
The final consideration is the license/litigation decision for the patentee,
represented as:
(33)
(34)
(35)
(36)
(37)

License where S'- L'> 0 =>
r + r' - (1 - w)sr - (1 - w)sr' + sw'e' - sc - (wr + we + w'r' + w'e' - c) > 0 =>
r + r'- (1 - w)sr - (1 - w)sr'+ sw'e'- sc - wr - we - w'r'- w'e'+ c > 0 =>
r - wr - sr + swr +r' - w'r'- sr'+ sw'r'+ c - sc > we + w'e' - sw'e' =>
(1 - s)[(] - w)r + (1 - w)r'+ c] > we + (I - s)w'e'

The new litigation decision is similar to the single licensee decision in Equation 18.
Patentees will consider the probabilistic opportunity cost of losing the particular
license, losing other licenses, and litigation costs. These are all adjusted by the chance
that a licensee would not have challenged. If the licensee would have challenged (s)

264. If future opportunities (sw'e) are large enough, the tax could theoretically be a "benefit"
rather than a cost. This is unlikely in practice, however, because future benefits that large would
lead patentees to choose litigation over licensing.
265. This is probably not entirely true in practice. As litigation stakes increase, the patentee
would likely spend more in litigation costs, some of which would be passed on to licensees as
well.
266. See, e.g., O'Connor, supranote 9, at 447 ("It is not only that the patentee could have
had someone else trying to commercialize its patent in the time it was exclusively licensed to the
now dead beat licensee, but also that very few companies may be willing to take a license from
the patentee after all that time has passed and there is a taint to the patent." (emphasis omitted)).
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then the risk of losing the patent is the same as choosing litigation, and thus the
patentee will not weigh those possibilities in the litigation/licensing choice. All that
matters is what might have happened if the patentee litigates against a licensee who
would have lived by the agreement.
The expected lost royalties and costs would be compared to the potential for
enhanced damages and higher license fees in the future if successful in litigation. The
slight wrinkle is that, as with the potential loss of the patent, patentees only consider
the opportunity cost of winning extra royalties if the licensee does not challenge ((1 s)w'e). If the licensee is going to challenge anyway (s), the chance for additional
royalties is no different than the litigation option. Note, though, that potential enhanced
damages (we) are not so adjusted because damages are only available if the patentee
litigates.
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APPENDIX II: SAMPLE LICENSE LANGUAGE
LITIGATION

1. Settlement and Covenant Not to Sue
A.

This license constitutes a settlement of all disputes between the parties
regarding the subject matter hereof, including, but not limited to, whether
or not any currently existing licensed products practice the Licensed Patent
and whether or not the Licensed Patent is valid. The parties agree that this
Agreement is entered into in order to avoid litigation relating to patent
infringement and/or invalidity. Each party relies on the consideration
granted herein, including but not limited to the provisions of this Section,
as the basis for the bargain between the parties in order to avoid litigation.

B.

The parties agree, and Licensee concedes, that the Licensed Patent is valid.
Each party covenants not to sue the other with respect to infringement of
any product for which Licensee ever pays a royalty. Each party covenants
not to sue the other with respect to validity of the Licensed Patent.

C.

If Licensee asserts in litigation that subsection B, above, is void or
otherwise unenforceable, and loses such challenge, then Licensee shall pay
to Licensor liquidated damages of $
, as well as all of
Licensor's attorneys' fees associated with the challenge to the Licensed
Patent's validity or infringement of any product. This subsection shall
survive any termination of this Agreement.
2. Breach of the Covenant by Licensee

The validity and enforceability of the settlement and covenant not to sue in Section
1 is an express condition of this agreement. Upon any challenge (including litigation,
reexamination, arbitration or other official proceedings, including counterclaims)
initiated by Licensee challenging the validity of the Licensed Patent or questioning
whether any licensed product for which a royalty is ever paid 267 is covered by the
Licensed Patent, Licensor may do one of the following:
A. Immediately terminate this Agreement, voiding Licensor's covenant not to
sue set forth in Section 1, and seek damages and an injunction, including
damages for willful infringement; or
B. Continue performance of this Agreement, in which case:

267. This provision allows for disputes about infiingement of future products without
triggering termination rights. However, once a royalty is paid under any product, infringement
of the patent by that product may no longer be challenged.
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The Royalty set forth in Section __ shall be multiplied by four. If a
final judgment or order determines that the Licensed Patent is
valid or that a particular product is covered by the license, then the
Royalty set forth in Section __ shall be multiplied by six for all
products licensed. The parties agree that this increase in royalty is
nonrefundable, and is reasonable compensation for the increased
nonattomey cost to the Licensor of defending such litigation,
including executive time, document collection and management,
internal counsel time, market price decline, market share decline,
and any other associated overhead, opportunity costs, and/or loss
of goodwill.
C.

In all events, Licensee shall reimburse Licensor for all attorneys' fees and
costs (both taxable and nontaxable) for defending such lawsuit, including
but not limited to all travel costs, document gathering, imaging, and
reproduction costs, expert costs, court costs, and meals. This subsection
shall survive any termination of this Agreement.

D. In the event that Licensee is held to be infringing and/or is not relieved of
its obligation to make payment under this Agreement pursuant to any final
judgment or order arising under or relating to this Agreement, including an
action for patent infringement, then Licensee shall reimburse Licensor for
all attorneys' fees and costs (both taxable and nontaxable) for defending
such lawsuit, including but not limited to all travel costs, document
gathering, imaging and reproduction costs, expert costs, court costs, and
meals.
3. Venue
A.

Notwithstanding Sections 1 and 2 above, any patent related suit brought by
Licensee against Licensor shall be brought in _,
and
Licensee expressly agrees to the jurisdiction of

B.

Any such suit shall be privately arbitrated before [American Arbitration
Association/JAMS] in accordance with such tribunal's expedited
arbitration rules. No discovery may be taken in such arbitration by either
party. Any ruling by the arbitrator shall be considered a private resolution
of the dispute between the parties (and if required by law an amendment to
this Agreement), and shall have no preclusive effect on either party against
third parties in any future litigation.
4. Application of Royalties

The parties acknowledge that this Agreement encompasses services, support, knowhow, and other nonpatent related consideration, and that such consideration is
indivisible from the patent license. Any invalidation of the Licensed Patent or any
finding that a product does not infringe the Licensed Patent shall not affect any
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consideration given by Licensee under this Agreement. Such consideration is

5. Severability and FutureApplicability
A.

If any part of this Section is found to be unenforceable, all other parts shall
remain in full force.

B.

If any final, nonappealable determination that Licensee is relieved of any
payment obligation arising under this Agreement due to invalidation of the
Licensed Patent or a finding that a product does not practice the Licensed
Patent, Licensee shall only be relieved of future payment obligations.

C.

Licensee's payment obligations under Subsection B shall not cease until
such final determination. Licensee shall not be relieved of any payment
obligations at the time of any challenge to its obligation to make such
payments. Licensee shall not be entitled to a refund of any payments owed.

D.

Licensee shall not seek, nor shall it abide by, any order placing any
payments owed under this Agreement into escrow or any other form of
deferred payment. Licensee shall actually pay to Licensor any payments
owed when due until Licensee obtains any final, nonappealable
determination that relieves it of such obligation.

E.

If, at any time, any appeals court (including the Supreme Court)
determines that invalidation/nonpractice of a Licensed Patent does not
obviate the requirement to pay license fees, then payments set forth in this
Agreement shall recommence from the date of such ruling forward.

